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THE COVERAGE/PROTECTION DISTINCTION IN THE
LAW OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH—AN ESSAY ON
META-DOCTRINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Mark Tushnet*

INTRODUCTION
An airline executive calls his counterpart at another airline and says that next
week he will send over the plans his company has to raise prices over the next
several months. The recipient of the call says, “That’s great. When I get them I’ll
send you our plans.”1 If the relevant market has few firms, the executives have likely
committed a violation of the antitrust laws by agreeing to exchange that information,
and their companies may be subject to civil and criminal liability for an offense that
consists of words alone.2 And, as should be obvious, the liability rests on these very
words and almost certainly would not attach if some other words had been exchanged, for example, “I just want to let you know that we’ll have the booth next
to yours at the upcoming trade show.”3 That is, liability attaches based on the content
of the speech.

* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Richard
Fallon, Frederick Schauer, L. Michael Seidman, Rebecca Tushnet, and Adrian Vermeule for
comments on earlier versions of this Essay. I also thank Einer Elhauge for guidance on points
raised by the Essay’s first paragraphs.
1
Cf. Diane Bartz, Airlines’ Undisciplined Talk May Have Led to Antitrust Probe: Experts,
REUTERS (July 2, 2015, 4:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-airlines-collusion-id
USKCN0PC2HT20150702 [https://perma.cc/HS5E-DW32] (reporting that airlines’ executives’
discussions of maintaining “discipline” provoked an inquiry by the Department of Justice).
2
See Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL
L. REV. 981, 1007–08 (2016) (“[A]greement stems from communicated intentions. . . . It is
the communication that itself creates the agreement.”). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
said that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is integral to criminal activity,
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949), but the context of those
statements makes it clear that the speech the Court had in mind was ancillary to some other
criminal activity. So, for example, the implicit reference in Giboney was to violence sometimes accompanying otherwise constitutionally protected picketing. Id. at 491–92. In the
example, in contrast, the antitrust crime consists entirely in the words manifesting agreement.
For a general discussion of the Giboney exception, see Volokh, supra, and for additional
discussion, see infra notes 93, 224–31 and accompanying text (discussing R. A. V. v. City of
St. Paul and Cohen v. California).
3
The qualification here is that a court might infer an agreement to fix prices from a
regular practice of exchanging information.
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Similar examples pervade the law. If the airline executives deny under oath that
they had the conversation, they have committed perjury.4 A person can find herself
liable for breach of contract if she responded to an offer to enter into a contract with
words that a court concludes objectively indicated assent to a reasonable person
even if the court believes she did not subjectively intend to assent.5 In the casebook
favorite Lucy v. Zehmer,6 for example, Zehmer wrote on a restaurant check words
saying that he would sell his farm to Lucy for $50,000.7 After Zehmer refused to go
through with the sale, claiming that the offer was merely a joke made while he was
intoxicated, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Lucy was entitled to specific performance because, whatever Zehmer’s subjective intent, the words he wrote would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that an offer was being made and could be
accepted in the usual way.8
Both these situations, and many others, involve the imposition of legal liability
for speech because of its content.9 Yet, hornbook law holds that content-based regulations of speech are constitutionally permissible only if they are narrowly tailored
in the service of a compelling governmental interest (a requirement sometimes
referred to as one placing content-based regulations under strict scrutiny).10 Further,
it is the conventional wisdom that satisfying strict scrutiny is quite difficult.11
Does this mean that imposing liability in the antitrust and contract cases violates
the First Amendment? Until recently, conventional free speech doctrine would have
4

For a discussion of why standard perjury statutes might not survive strict First Amendment review, see infra notes 157–71 and accompanying text.
5
See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954).
6
84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
7
Id. at 518; see Barak Richman & Dennis Schmelzer, When Money Grew on Trees: Lucy
v. Zehmer and Contracting in a Boom Market, 61 DUKE L.J. 1511, 1513 n.2 (2012) (listing
casebooks in which Lucy v. Zehmer appears).
8
Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 521–22.
9
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“Numerous examples
could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment,
such as the exchange of information about securities, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), corporate proxy statements, Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the exchange of price and production information
among competitors, American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921),
and employers’ threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees, NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).”).
10
For the Court’s most recent pronouncement to this effect, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”(citations omitted)).
11
See Adam Liptak, Consequences Ripple After Court Expands Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2015, at A15 (quoting Floyd Abrams: “When a court applies strict scrutiny in determining whether a law is consistent with the First Amendment, . . . only the rarest statute survives
the examination.”).
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answered, of course not. That doctrine placed these problem cases in a separate
category to which the requirement of strict scrutiny did not apply. Frederick Schauer
has developed the most extended analysis of that category, which he describes as
one in which communicative activity (presumptively, “speech”)12 is not even “covered”
by the First Amendment.13 The agreement to exchange price information would not
be covered by the First Amendment because it was commercial speech, for example.14
Recent cases, including United States v. Stevens,15 Holder v. Humanitarian Law
12

Although there are of course problem cases around the edges, an activity is communicative, according to the Court, if it is both intended by the “speaker” to communicate
and is likely, under the circumstances, to be understood by the “listener” as communicating
something. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam) (“An intent
to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”).
Communicative activity not covered by the First Amendment is of course subject to
constitutional examination, but qua communicative activity its regulation is permissible if
the government has a rational basis for doing so. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Justice Kagan
described this requirement as “the laugh test[,]” and would have invalidated the ordinance
at issue there because it failed even that test. 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring). In
addition, regulation of uncovered speech might sometimes violate constitutional provisions
other than the First Amendment, such as the Takings Clause.
13
For Schauer’s definition, see Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and
“Obscenity”: An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J.
899, 905 n.33 (1979) [hereinafter Schauer, Speech and “Speech”] (“If an activity is covered
by the first amendment, regulation of that activity is evaluated in light of the heightened
standard of review required by the first amendment. If the state cannot meet the burden of
showing a very strong governmental interest in regulating covered activity, that activity is
protected as well. But if the state can put forth a justification that withstands strict scrutiny,
the activity is not protected even though it is covered.”). See generally Frederick Schauer,
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries]; Frederick
Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 346 (2015)
[hereinafter Schauer, Out of Range] (more recent statements of Schauer’s position).
Alternative formulations of the same thought are that some expressive acts are “outside
the scope” or “outside the reach” of the First Amendment. Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1361 (2015) (arguing that “[a] lack of First Amendment
coverage works very differently from a categorical exclusion[,]” because categorical exclusions “require the Court to chart the excluded category and to give legislatures firm guidance
about which speech does and does not fit within the category[,]” while “legislatures decide
what to do about uncovered speech with little, if any, judicial oversight”). With respect, this
distinction seems mistaken, because identifying speech as “uncovered” requires the same
“chart[ing]” of the uncovered speech’s boundaries.
14
For catalogues of examples in which content-based regulations appear to occur, in
contexts ordinarily thought uncontroversial, see Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1614–16 nn.1–16 (2015);
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 138 n.9.
15
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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Project,16 and a series of commercial speech cases threaten to destabilize the distinction and thereby unsettle seemingly obvious and obviously correct results. First
Amendment doctrine using the coverage/protection distinction identifies three categories of communicative activity and subjects regulation of each category to a different
standard of review: regulations of communicative activity that is not covered by the
First Amendment are constitutionally permissible if they satisfy a standard of minimal rationality; regulations of communicative activity that is covered by the First
Amendment are sometimes not protected by that amendment if the regulations are
justified by a strong governmental interest and are well-designed to advance that
interest; finally, regulations of covered communicative activity are otherwise not
constitutionally permissible.17
This Essay examines the pressure recent cases place on the coverage/protection
distinction. The examination shows that contemporary doctrine preserves the obvious and traditional results in the antitrust and contract cases, but only by doctrinal
moves that require what I call “too much work.”18 Doctrines that require ordinary
judges do too much work to reach obvious results ought to be avoided because too
often ordinary judges will make mistakes—from the point of view of a higher court—
as they try to implement the complex doctrines step by step. This Essay then uses
the analysis it develops to explore some aspects of what I call “meta-doctrine.” Metadoctrine comes in two forms, both illustrated in the First Amendment doctrines
examined in this Essay. First, meta-doctrines include concepts that provide the structure or architecture within which more specific doctrines are located; the coverage/
protection distinction is this type of meta-doctrine. Second, meta-doctrines include
general prescriptions about what the structure of doctrine should look like. To extend
the metaphor, this type of meta-doctrine deals with the use of wood or steel in
constructing doctrine. The “too much work” principle is this type of meta-doctrine.
This Essay begins in Part I by describing the distinction between coverage and
protection as it was articulated until recently. Part II continues by fleshing out the distinction and introduces some of the problems associated with eliminating it. Part III
extends the treatment of recent cases by examining United States v. Stevens and
United States v. Alvarez19—cases that raise substantial questions about the distinction’s continuing viability, noting as well some of the analytical difficulties with the
Court’s opinions in both cases. Part IV then describes in more detail why something
like the coverage/protection distinction may be necessary if we are to understand
and preserve some intuitively obvious outcomes such as the fact that aspects of
16

561 U.S. 1 (2010).
See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226, 2228; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470; Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
18
The examination also shows that other traditional results cannot be salvaged even with
a great effort.
19
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
17
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contract law and the crime of perjury, standardly defined, should not raise First
Amendment questions that require extended analysis to support the conclusion that
the regulations are constitutionally permissible. Part V deals with some of the ways
First Amendment doctrine could be restructured were the coverage/protection distinction to be abandoned, for example, by treating all communicative activity as
covered but applying differentiated standards of review to different categories of
content-based regulations. Part VI offers a modest suggestion about how to draw the
line between material that is covered by the First Amendment and material that is
not.20 The Conclusion uses the coverage/protection distinction to sketch the role of
meta-doctrines in constitutional law.
I. THE COVERAGE/PROTECTION DISTINCTION AS ARTICULATED IN THE 1940S
AND ASPECTS OF ITS LATER DEVELOPMENT
The coverage/protection distinction was first articulated in two cases in the
1940s, cases the Court at the time treated as routine.21 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire22
offered the (until recently) conventional account of categories of uncovered speech.23
Chaplinsky upheld a conviction for addressing “derisive or annoying word[s]” to
another person where the words directly tended to cause a breach of the peace by
provoking the target to respond with violence.24 Justice Frank Murphy explained,
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or “fighting” words. . . . It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.25
20

Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, offers a sociological and historical account of the
reasons for the distinction’s creation and persistence. My aim in the Conclusion is somewhat
more normative.
21
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568–74 (occupying seven pages in the U.S. Reports); Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52–55 (1942) (occupying four pages in the U.S. Reports). There
were no dissents in either case.
22
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
23
Id. at 571–72.
24
Id. at 569.
25
Id. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted) (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 149–50 (1941)). For more extensive discussion of Chaplinsky, see infra notes
28–34 and accompanying text.
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This formulation contains two themes, a historical one—“have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem”—and a functional one, “no essential
part of any exposition of ideas” and “slight social value . . . clearly outweighed by
the social interest[.]”26 These two themes might be related in several ways. They
might be independent but contingently convergent reasons for the fact that regulation does not raise constitutional problems. If so, there might be additional categories of speech as to which the same conclusion could be drawn—categories other
than the enumerated ones that either have historically never been thought to raise
constitutional problems (think here of perjury and contract enforcement),27 or that
include expressions that are no essential part of the exposition of ideas and are of
slight social value, clearly outweighed by some public interest. Alternatively, the
themes might be related in an explanatory mode: The categories have never been
thought to raise constitutional problems because expressions in the categories have
such slight social value . . . , etc. On this view, the historical analysis has analytic
priority; we could not identify other categories similar to the lewd, and the like,
simply by doing functional analysis.
The Court in Chaplinsky did not have to choose between these alternatives.28
Later developments, though, push the question of the relation between the two themes
to the fore, and in ways that highlight the coverage/protection distinction. “The obscene” is an example of communicative material whose regulation is best understood
as resting on the proposition that obscene materials are not covered by the First
Amendment.29 Assume that we are dealing with materials that are unquestionably
obscene according to the definition in Miller v. California.30 The Court explained why
26

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
Notably, many—perhaps all—such cases might not generate litigation precisely because the idea that they raised First Amendment issues would be almost literally unthinkable.
This point is one of the main themes in Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13. For a discussion
of the implications of historical silence, see supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
28
In an important article, Genevieve Lakier shows that Chaplinsky must have applied a
low standard of review, not a stringent one, because when Chaplinsky was decided the Court
had only recently begun to distinguish between what we would now call high-value (at its
core, political) speech and low-value speech such as speech in the categories Chaplinsky
listed. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2173
(2015). For a critical response, see generally Schauer, Out of Range, supra note 13. Before
that time, Lakier argues, all regulations of speech were subject to assessment by a lax, not
a stringent, standard. Lakier, supra, at 2179. The then-recent innovation was to carve out some
categories of speech and subject regulation of those categories to stringent review. Id. at
2171. The “residual” categories—everything else, including the categories in Chaplinsky—
received low-level review. Id. at 2173–74. As the innovation settled in, it was natural to
begin to think in terms of coverage versus protection: Materials whose regulation received
stringent review were covered by the First Amendment, and the residual categories were not.
29
Lakier, supra note 28, at 2171.
30
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
27
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regulation of such material was constitutionally permissible: “[T]here are legitimate
state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity . . . . These
include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public
safety itself.”31 Even putting to one side the likelihood that those interests would not
be considered compelling in other contexts, the Court itself describes them as
“legitimate,” not “compelling” or something similar.32 The Court also said that
“there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime[,]” and
that, though “there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature . . . could quite reasonably determine
that such a connection does or might exist.”33 I believe that these formulations
cannot reasonably be read as asserting that bans on the dissemination of obscene
materials satisfy a stringent standard of review, that is, that obscene materials are
covered by the First Amendment but not protected by it. Rather, they say, almost in
terms, that obscene materials are not covered by the First Amendment. The obscenity cases are consistent with the view that nothing in Chaplinsky suggests that the
obscene is covered but unprotected because regulation satisfies a stringent standard
of review, and its functional theme is stated in terms that suggest that the standard
of review is not stringent.34
Valentine v. Chrestensen35 was what we would now call a commercial speech
case (or an environmental law case). New York City prohibited the distribution of
“commercial and business advertising” handbills.36 The prohibition was applied to
Chrestensen’s handbills advertising on one side a submarine that he operated as a
tourist attraction, and on the other protesting the city’s refusal to allow him to moor
the submarine at the docks the city owned.37 The Supreme Court rejected Chrestensen’s
First Amendment challenge.38 Justice Owen Roberts’s opinion agreed that city
streets “are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that [cities] . . . may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.”39 But, he continued,
[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what
31

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–58 (1973).
Id. at 69.
33
Id. at 58, 60–61.
34
The formulation in Chaplinsky is only suggestive, though, because it is possible to read
“clearly outweighed” as indicating that a stringent standard is indeed satisfied.
35
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
36
Id. at 53.
37
Id. at 52–53.
38
Id. at 54–55.
39
Id. at 54.
32
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extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the
streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation
of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.40
Valentine thereby held that commercial advertising was not covered by the First
Amendment, its regulation being subject entirely to legislative discretion.41
Thirty years later the Court gave some commercial advertising a degree of
constitutional protection, ultimately settling on the test from Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission42 for determining the constitutionality of regulation of truthful non-misleading commercial speech.43 For present purposes the details of the Central Hudson test are unimportant; what matters is that the
test is not the stringent one applied to material at the heart of the First Amendment’s
coverage.
The Court has continued to apply the Central Hudson test, at least nominally.44
But, its presence in the structure of constitutional doctrine has created some awkwardness. As Rebecca Brown has recently pointed out, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
statement in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley45 that “above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content” has become the touchstone
of contemporary First Amendment law.46 Applying the less stringent Central Hudson
test to truthful non-misleading commercial speech, though, does “restrict” expression
because of its (commercial) subject matter, relative to speech, the regulation of which
is tested by a more stringent standard.47 That doctrinal anomaly may be one reason
for a perceptible shift in the Court’s tone when dealing with truthful non-misleading
commercial speech.48 Three of the Court’s sitting Justices have expressed disagreement with the proposition that such speech should be tested by a less-than-stringent
40

Id. The Court treated Chrestensen’s placement [on the handbill of the protest against
the city’s action] as an intentional attempt to evade the ban, and refused to allow such an
evasion because otherwise “every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in
the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from
the law’s command.” Id. at 55.
41
Id. at 54.
42
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
43
Id. at 566.
44
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
45
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
46
Police Dep’t of Chi., 408 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added). See generally Rebecca L.
Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953 (2016).
47
There may be an additional anomaly associated with the assumed impermissibility of
regulation based upon a speaker’s identity: I think it unlikely that courts that allow some
regulation of speech by commercial entities would allow the same regulation when applied
to exactly the same speech when made by an entity like Consumer Reports.
48
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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standard, though they have not done so all at the same time.49 Further, most of the
recent cases do something akin to arguing in the alternative: The opinions express
skepticism about the continuing viability of Central Hudson and note that the regulation at issue would not survive stringent review, but conclude that the regulation
does not even satisfy the Central Hudson test.50
Eliminating the distinction between coverage and protection while retaining the
rule that content-based regulations must satisfy a stringent standard of review places
some intuitively appealing results—such as that perjury prosecutions raise no
serious First Amendment issues—under substantial pressure.51 United States v.
Stevens appears to have sharply restricted the category of uncovered speech.52 There
the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute making it a crime to make and
disseminate depictions of extreme forms of animal cruelty (“crush videos”).53 The
government relied on Chaplinsky in defending the statute.54 The Court agreed that
some categories of speech lay outside the First Amendment, but those categories
were to be identified (mostly) with reference to history.55 Retaining the coverage/
protection distinction through a narrowly defined historical test preserves some of
those results, but at the cost of introducing uncertainty about whether other intuitively appealing results can be preserved through historical analysis.56
In the problem cases, what if the escape hatch that allows regulation of speech
because it is not covered by the First Amendment is closed or left open only a slight
bit? The remaining escape hatch under current doctrine is the strict scrutiny requirement.57 That is, problem cases that might previously have been dealt with as involving uncovered speech might be handled by saying that the regulations at issue were
narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests. As I argue in Part IV, often that
conclusion would be difficult to support were the conventional understanding of the
strict scrutiny requirement to be applied.58
Again, though, a recent decision suggests the possibility that the conventional
understanding should be revised. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project upheld the
49

Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (listing Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg
as “hav[ing] expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis”). I suspect that Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would join this group, making a majority, were they to be
faced with a case involving a regulation about which they were skeptical but that might
survive scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.
50
See, e.g., id. at 367–68 (noting that though “several Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis, . . . there is no need in this case to break
new ground”).
51
See infra Part III.
52
559 U.S. 460, 468–73 (2010).
53
Id. at 464.
54
Id. at 468–69.
55
Id. at 470.
56
See infra Part III.
57
See infra Part IV.
58
See infra Part IV.
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constitutionality of a statute making it a crime to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations, as applied to a group that gave advice to such organizations about how to use international law to resolve disputes peacefully.59 The Court
applied what it described as strict scrutiny, but on the face of it, the Court’s opinion
does not apply strict scrutiny in the manner suggested by the conventional understanding.60 In particular, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court deferred to
legislative and executive judgments that providing advice to terrorist groups implicates the compelling interest in combating terrorism, because the advice “frees up
other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends[,]” “helps
lend legitimacy” to the groups, and “strain[s] the United States’ relationships with
its allies.”61 The Chief Justice acknowledged that the Court ordinarily does not defer
to legislative and executive judgments about the relationship between regulations
and harm when it uses strict scrutiny.62
Holder suggests the possibility that the “strict scrutiny” escape hatch might be
somewhat more open than the conventional understanding suggests. If Holder has
implications beyond the national security context, a question the Court has yet to
address, its somewhat relaxed application of strict scrutiny might be a way of dealing with the problem cases. Yet, relaxing the stringency of the strict scrutiny test
creates a tension with the Court’s rationale for adopting the historical approach to
uncovered speech. In adopting that approach, the Court’s rationale was that alternative ways of identifying uncovered categories of speech placed too much discretion
in the courts.63 Part V identifies several ways of relaxing the stringency of the strictscrutiny test and argues that each introduces precisely the discretion that the Court
sought to avoid.64
These decisions place heavy pressure on the coverage/protection distinction. As
with any doctrine, abandoning the distinction is conceptually possible, but doing so
requires significant doctrinal reconstruction to explain outcomes that follow straightforwardly from the coverage/protection distinction.65 Some aspects of that reconstruction are not entirely plausible, but perhaps the more important difficulty is that
the reconstruction requires that we do substantial analytic work to reach intuitively
obvious conclusions. The fact that a doctrinal structure requires a great deal of work
on easy questions is an argument against adopting that doctrine—in this context, an
59

561 U.S. 1, 7, 39 (2010).
See id. at 28.
61
Id. at 30, 32.
62
Id. at 34 (“We do not defer to the Government’s reading of the First Amendment, even
when [national security] interests are at stake. . . . But when it comes to collecting evidence
and drawing factual inferences in this area, . . . respect for the Government’s conclusions is
appropriate.”). The Chief Justice alluded to the case’s circumstances, which counseled the
Court to rely on “informed judgment rather than concrete evidence.” Id. at 34–35.
63
See infra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.
64
See infra Part V.
65
I discuss examples such as the law of obscenity and perjury below.
60
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argument against abandoning the coverage/protection distinction. This Essay argues
that the distinction, or something very much like it, probably is close to necessary if
we are to have a reasonably coherent doctrinal structure for the First Amendment.66
II. ELABORATING THE DISTINCTION’S SIGNIFICANCE
Consider these scenarios: (1) A dapper young man spends an afternoon poisoning pigeons in the park;67 (2) A dapper young man hands out leaflets to park-goers
with the printed message, “Unless the government does something about those
damned pigeons that are making the park unvisitable because of their droppings,
we’ll have to take some revengeance on the pigeons by poisoning them”;68 (3) A
dapper young man shouts to an angry crowd enraged by pigeon droppings in the
park, “Let’s go right now to poison the pigeons in the park.”
What does the First Amendment have to say about possible defenses to government
charges of poisoning the pigeons, or attempting or conspiring to do so? Brandenburg
v. Ohio69 tells us that the First Amendment has some bearing on scenarios two and
three. Using the distinction between coverage and protection: In scenario one, the First
Amendment has no bearing at all; as Schauer puts it, the First Amendment simply does
not show up in the legal analysis.70 In contrast, in scenario two the speaker’s activity
is both covered by the First Amendment and protected by it, whereas in scenario
three, the speaker’s activity is covered by the First Amendment but not protected by
66

I am aware that this formulation is full of qualifiers.
See Tom Lehrer, Poisoning Pigeons in the Park, YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2007), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=yhuMLpdnOjY.
68
I take the word “revengeance” from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969)
(per curiam) (quoting the speech there held constitutionally protected).
69
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
70
Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, at 1767. In one sense, of course, the First Amendment does “show up”: One must look into such things as whether the activity in question
implicates the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect to determine whether one is
dealing with speech or, for example, “mere” exercises of human autonomy (to be gross, like
picking one’s nose). But, having determined that the interests are not implicated, one then
engages in no First Amendment analysis—applies no First Amendment level of review, for
example, whatsoever.
This does not mean that the Constitution has no bearing on the case. The regulation
might be completely irrational, for example, or it might be too vague to survive due process
review. See, e.g., United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595–96 (W.D.
Pa. 2005) (holding a federal obscenity statute unconstitutional as a violation of the substantive due process rights recognized in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). The
important point here is that the First Amendment does not say anything relevant to the actor’s
criminal liability. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2239 (2015) (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (applying the “laugh” test); Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 182 (2012) (discussing the application of a rational-basis standard
to regulations of uncovered material).
67
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it.71 The difference between scenarios two and three lies in the standard of review
applied to the activity: A lawyer advising the dapper young man might tell him that
he’s much more likely to get away with the statement in scenario two than with the
one in scenario three, and that advice might affect the choices the young man makes.
Suppose, though, that the dapper young man does something other than speech
but with communicative content? A recent case involved California’s ban on selling
foie gras at restaurants.72 A well-known chef in Napa Valley opposed the ban, and
to protest it he included foie gras as a “gift” from the host on his restaurant’s most
expensive tasting menu, accompanying the course with a “protest card” explaining
his opposition to the ban on selling foie gras.73 In ensuing litigation, the chef submitted a declaration stating,
In the exercise of my constitutionally protected right of petition
and free speech, my restaurant . . . is protesting the law, not
breaking it, by giving away foie gras to customers I choose to
give it to. . . . [W]hat I . . . give away to customers is my way of
dumping tea in the harbor, so to speak.74
Is the chef’s activity both covered and protected by the First Amendment, covered
but not protected, or not covered at all? Note that if the activity is covered, to find
it unprotected we would have to say that imposing liability on the chef satisfied a
stringent standard of review (subject to qualifications discussed below about the
commercial speech doctrine and United States v. O’Brien75). And, for present purposes I want to stipulate that finding a stringent standard satisfied would be quite
difficult. For example, is acting to protect the well-being of geese a compelling
governmental interest? (Geese!, the omnivore skeptic might exclaim.) Is a complete
ban a narrowly tailored method of advancing that interest? (Perhaps a system of
inspecting goose-raising facilities would be as effective in protecting the geese’s
well-being.)76
71

See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. LT Napa Partners LLC, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 761–62
(Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
73
See id. at 762 & n.4.
74
Id. at 769.
75
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
76
For a recent example applying strict scrutiny in this manner, see Cahaly v. Larosa, 796
F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015). There the court of appeals held unconstitutional a state statute that
prohibited robo-calling for consumer or political purposes, with exceptions for, among other
things, robo-calls to those with whom the caller had a previous business relationship (that is,
to those who had previously bought something from the caller). Id. at 402, 404. The court
of appeals held that the state’s interest in protecting privacy could have been satisfied by
narrower regulations such as requiring compliance with a do-not-call list or prohibiting robocalls only during specified hours such as typical mealtimes. Id. at 405–06.
72
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The example—and others that can be developed77—strongly suggest that a coherent First Amendment doctrine requires that some regulations of communicative
activity (some communicative activity, of course, not all such activity) be constitutionally permissible even though the communicative activity does not satisfy a
stringent standard of review.78 That is, the only alternative First Amendment doctrine
would appear to be one applying a stringent standard to all communicative activities,
and that seems to generate results that seem wrong even after sustained reflection.
The issue finally surfaced in the Supreme Court’s consideration of a municipal ordinance regulating signs.79
Outdoor signs serve many functions. Some advertise businesses, others promote
civic or political causes, and others direct people to events like yard sales, neighborhood block parties, and church services. All such signs add to the visual clutter in
communities, sometimes distracting motorists and nearly always altering the
aesthetic experience of moving around the community. Cities and towns regulate
outdoor signs to deal with these problems. The town of Gilbert, Arizona, had a sign
ordinance that applied different rules to different types of signs, making the judgment that different types of signs have different trade-offs between the information
and other speech-related values associated with signs and the signs’ aesthetic costs.80
So, for example, “ideological” signs could be relatively large and could be placed
outdoors permanently, while “political” signs had to be smaller and could be displayed for two months before an election and had to be removed within fifteen days
after it.81 Another category of signs involved temporary directional ones, such as
those used for yard sales and, as it turned out, for the religious services held by a
local church.82 Rather clearly having yard sales and the like in mind, the town required that signs directing people to these events be relatively small, and specified
that such signs could be placed outdoors no more than twelve hours before the event,
to be removed within one hour after its conclusion.83
77

One example sometimes used is politically motivated murder (“assassination”). The
difficulty with the example is that it is relatively easy to find that a ban on assassination does
satisfy a stringent standard of review, so that assassination becomes another example of
covered but not protected activity.
78
For the moment, I will treat the term “stringent standard of review” to refer to a test
that requires a compelling governmental interest and includes a “least restrictive means” or
“narrow tailoring” requirement. Later I will discuss doctrines that are stringent but not quite
as stringent as that, and examine why we might have misgivings about developing such
standards. See infra Part V.
79
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
80
Id. at 2224.
81
Id. at 2224–25.
82
Id.
83
Id. (describing the ordinance’s provisions). For a discussion of the decision’s implications for sign ordinances generally, see Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation
After Reed: Suggestions for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 URBAN LAW. 569 (2015).
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A church that lacked a permanent home and therefore held services at varying
locations in town challenged the ordinance’s treatment of temporary directional
signs, on the sensible ground that the tight temporal limits on posting signs telling
people where to go to find the services substantially limited its ability to reach potential worshipers.84 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the sign
ordinance differentiated among different types of speech based on their content, as
it obviously did because political signs and signs directing people to church services
were treated differently, and then held that the ordinance failed to survive the stringent
requirements imposed on content-based regulations.85 Temporary directional signs
were no more aesthetically unappealing than ideological ones, for example, and yet
the former were more tightly regulated than the latter. The Court accurately noted
that content-neutral regulations might accomplish many of the town’s aesthetic and
other goals,86 but did not address the town’s implicit claim that its differentiated
system embodied defensible judgments about trade-offs between aesthetics and the
kinds of social value to which the First Amendment responds.87 The implication, I
think, is that the rule requiring strong justifications for content-based regulations
rests on the Court’s determination that legislatures must treat all communicative
activities as having equal social value—and on its determination that, because some
communicative activities clearly have substantial social value, content-based regulations of all communicative activities must meet the standards appropriately invoked with respect to communicative activities with substantial social value.
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.88 His opinion contained a long paragraph enumerating “speech regulated by government that inevitably involve[s] content discrimination, but where a strong presumption against constitutionality has no
place.”89 He listed securities regulations requiring specific content in registration statements, energy conservation labeling-practices, requirements that prescription medications display specific labels, information disclosures required by the income tax
laws, the familiar “fasten your seatbelt” briefings required on commercial airplanes,
and “signs at [privately operated] petting zoos” advising visitors to wash their hands
on leaving.90
84

Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225. Church services were held on Sunday mornings, which meant
that the directional signs could be placed outdoors no earlier than late on Saturday nights.
85
See id. at 2232.
86
Id. Justice Alito made the same point more extensively in a concurring opinion. Id. at
2233–34 (Alito, J., concurring).
87
I use this awkward formulation because, as Frederick Schauer reminded me, many
things (food, good public transportation) have social value but not “First Amendment value.”
88
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89
Id. at 2234–35.
90
Id. Most of Justice Breyer’s examples involve government mandated disclosures rather
than government prohibitions on statements by regulated entities. Id. Perhaps one could respond
to his examples by applying a less stringent standard of review to mandated disclosures than to
direct prohibitions. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (drawing such a distinction).
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Justice Breyer’s examples in Reed v. Town of Gilbert91 show why the distinction
between coverage and protection is an important one. In Schauer’s terms, the regulations Justice Breyer lists might be treated as ones dealing with communicative
activities that are not covered by the First Amendment.92

91

135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
Other ways of dealing with the examples, including Justice Breyer’s preferred method,
are discussed at infra Section V.C.
92

1088

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1073

Consider how we should analyze Justice Breyer’s example of the requirement
that prescription medications have the specific label “Rx only” after Reed v. Town
of Gilbert. I think it would be difficult to conclude that the regulation serves a compelling governmental interest in a narrowly tailored way (or is the least restrictive
means of advancing a compelling interest). The government interest appears to be
something like, “keep prescription medications out of the hands of people who don’t
need them or who might abuse them,” but that interest is served already by the
requirement that one have a prescription in the first place; the labeling requirement
makes at most a small contribution on the margin to advancing the government’s
interest, for example, by cautioning people who happen to find a discarded bottle in
the grass from using the medication. And yet, I suspect that most readers are likely
to have an intuition that the labeling requirement is either innocuous or beneficial
enough to be constitutionally permissible.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert is only the latest in an accumulating set of cases that,
taken together, erode the foundations of the coverage/protection distinction. Part III
turns to other cases in that set.
III. ABANDONING THE DISTINCTION?: STEVENS, ALVAREZ, AND
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The first challenge to the coverage/protection distinction may have come in
R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul.93 As the case came to the Court, it involved the constitutionality of a municipal regulation of fighting words, a category expressly defined
in Chaplinsky as not covered by the First Amendment.94 Saying that fighting words
were not covered, though, did not make them “invisible to the Constitution.”95 As
construed by the majority, the ordinance imposed liability on a subset of fighting
words identified with reference to the viewpoint they expressed.96 The First Amendment’s rule against viewpoint-discrimination was fully applicable to fighting words.97
Justice Scalia’s opinion offered a cogent example: It would be unconstitutional to
prohibit “only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government.”98 That observation cast a cloud over the coverage/protection distinction itself
93

505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 380–81.
95
Id. at 383.
96
Whether that is an accurate characterization of the ordinance is contestable, but that
question is not of concern here.
97
Id. at 391–92.
98
Id. at 384. The example works because under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973), obscenity is determined with reference to the work taken as a whole; something that
is, taken as a whole, legally obscene might indeed contain parts conveying criticism of the
government. This analysis requires that we be able to disaggregate the expression into a
component conveying a message and a component not conveying a message. So, in Justice
94
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because it showed that First Amendment rules did indeed apply to material previously thought uncovered.
The next step came in United States v. Stevens. Defending the constitutionality
of a statute making it a crime to make and disseminate “depictions of [extreme forms
of] animal cruelty” (“crush videos”), the government relied on Chaplinsky’s functional theme to support the proposition that such depictions were not covered by the
First Amendment.99 Chief Justice Roberts described the government’s position—
actually, the position described in Chaplinsky’s functional theme—as “startling and
dangerous.”100 The Court agreed that some categories of speech lay outside the First
Amendment, but those categories were to be identified (mostly) with reference to
history.101 On the Court’s analysis, the functional theme in Chaplinsky explained
why the enumerated categories of speech had historically been regarded as outside
the First Amendment’s scope, but did not provide an independent ground for identifying other such categories.102 The Court did not have “a freewheeling authority
to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”103
Rather, the categories were to be identified through a historical inquiry.
The list in Chaplinsky of categories outside the First Amendment’s coverage might
not be definitive, because there might be “some categories of speech that have been
historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed
as such in our case law.”104 Genevieve Lakier’s historical work identifies a deep
problem with the Court’s assumptions.105 As the Court saw things, the First Amendment covered almost all communicative activities defined with reference to their
content, with some modest residual categories such as those listed in Chaplinsky.106
And, importantly, for the Stevens Court, describing a communicative activity as
covered by the First Amendment implies that “our existing doctrine” applies107: The
regulations must satisfy a stringent standard of review. Lakier shows that this picture
is almost exactly backwards. Historically, regulation of every form of expression
Scalia’s example, a sign saying “all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten,” R. A. V., 505 U.S.
at 391–92, has as its “fighting words” component the word for which Justice Scalia wrote
“misbegotten,” and has “anti-Catholic bigots” as its message-conveying component.
99
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (quoting Brief of the United
States). As the Court described the government’s position, it was that the depictions were
“outside the reach of [the First] Amendment altogether,” which is to say that they are not
covered by the First Amendment. Id.
100
Id. at 470.
101
Id. at 468–70.
102
See id. at 471 (“But such descriptions are just that—descriptive. They do not set forth
a test that may be applied as a general matter . . . .”).
103
Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
104
Id.
105
See Lakier, supra note 28.
106
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69.
107
Id. at 472.
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that came to judicial attention was subject to a weak standard of review.108 The
residual category was what we might now call core political speech, or as Valentine
v. Chrestensen put it, “civic appeal[s], or . . . moral platitude[s].”109
A truly historical approach, then, might put the burden on the person producing
the regulated speech to show that the expression fell within a category that historically received the protection afforded by a stringent standard of review. Alternatively,
the very fact that there are few, if any, cases raising First Amendment questions about
a category—perjury, contractual agreements—might be taken to demonstrate that those
subjects had “never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem[,]”110 and so
could still be treated as outside the First Amendment’s coverage even after Stevens.
One difficulty with that course, though, is temporal: How long-standing does the
regulation have to be for it to satisfy the “never been thought” criterion? The relevant
antitrust law dates to the early twentieth century. Is that long enough to satisfy the
criterion? Should we ask whether some communicative activities, even if not actually
regulated prior to the development of modern First Amendment law in the 1920s and
1930s, would have been thought to be freely regulable—that is, regulable without
satisfying a stringent standard of review?111 After all, the absence of regulation
might reflect not a judgment that regulation was constitutionally impermissible, but
instead a judgment that regulation was not a matter of public importance—yet. As
Justice Scalia once observed, in connection with harms previously unrecognized as
public nuisances, legislatures can “make the implication[s] of . . . background
principles . . . explicit.”112 That would seem to be true as well of previously unrecognized forms of uncovered speech.
Even as limited in this way, the Stevens approach might place pressure on some
aspects of contemporary securities and labor law. Notably, a dissent in one of the
initial cases upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act focused on the First Amendment.113 In 1940, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held unconstitutional an NLRB order prohibiting the Ford Motor
Company from making anti-union statements during a labor organizing campaign.114
Rather than regulations of speech in connection with labor organizing having “never
108

See Lakier, supra note 28, at 2171.
316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
110
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
111
An example might be modern disclosure mandates, which for present purposes I think can
be dated to the early 1930s, precisely when modern First Amendment law began to take shape.
112
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
113
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133–41 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
The majority rejected the First Amendment challenge. Id. at 130–33 (majority opinion).
114
NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1940). For a discussion of
contemporary First Amendment challenges to aspects of labor law, see Thomas M. Johnson
Jr., Ambushing Employers’ Speech Rights, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2015, at A19 (arguing that
regulations restricting employers’ ability to oppose organizing efforts through speech against
unions are unconstitutional).
109
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been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,”115 such regulations have been
subject to constitutional challenge from the very beginning.116
The Court’s discussion in Stevens and New York v. Ferber117 raises another
difficulty—the introduction of apparently ad hoc exceptions to a structure whose
primary defense lies in its resistance to making exceptions beyond those historically
recognized.118 Ferber upheld the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing making
and disseminating child pornography, a category defined in a way that included
within it material that would not satisfy the Miller test for obscenity.119 For the Court
in Stevens, Ferber’s rationale was that “[t]he market for child pornography was
‘intrinsically related’ to . . . underlying [acts of child] abuse, and was therefore ‘an
integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the
Nation.’”120 Because speech that is “an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute” is freely regulable, Ferber was “grounded . . . in a previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech.”121 By suppressing the market
for child pornography, the government diminishes the amount of child abuse (that
which occurs for the purpose of creating material to be disseminated).122
All this may be true, but as Justice Alito pointed out in his dissent in Stevens,
the substance of the analysis seems applicable to “crush videos” as well: The market
for such material is “intrinsically related” to animal abuse, which appears to be
illegal “throughout the Nation.”123 There are acts of animal abuse that would not
occur but for the fact that videos of them find a market, so, just as in Ferber, suppressing the market reduces the incidence of animal abuse. Chief Justice Roberts did
not directly address this argument.124 He said, instead, that “Ferber presented a
115

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
Employer anti-union speech might be characterized as “commercial speech,” though
it is not at the core of such speech—it does not propose a commercial transaction. Rather,
it seems more like issue advertising, speech aimed at increasing the speaker’s commercial
prospects, by avoiding unionization through anti-union speech and by gaining public support
for business-friendly policies through issue advertising.
117
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
118
Id. at 767–69, 774. Though the problem discussed in the text is not directly tied to the
coverage/protection distinction, the way the Court handled it does have some implications
for thinking about that distinction.
119
Id. at 750, 761, 774.
120
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
121
Id. (citations omitted).
122
Id.
123
See id. at 500–05 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 471 (majority opinion)) (appendix listing state animal cruelty statutes).
124
His opinion offers an indirect implicit response. The Court held that the “crush video”
statute was unconstitutional because it was overbroad, meaning that its terms clearly applied
to a substantial number of expressive acts that were constitutionally protected—depictions
of animals being wounded or killed, which are not necessarily acts of animal cruelty. Id. at
116
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special case.”125 On this view, Ferber is an ad hoc exception within an otherwise
general doctrinal structure.126 Yet, allowing ad hoc exceptions contradicts the very
purpose of tying the recognition of categorical exceptions to historical tradition,
which is to avoid the prospect of judicial decisions guided by a balancing test derived from Chaplinsky’s functional formulation.
United States v. Alvarez, invalidating the Stolen Valor Act making it a crime for
a person to claim falsely that he or she had been awarded a military honor, followed
Stevens’s analytical approach, elaborating a bit by explaining why only some false
statements were not covered by the First Amendment.127 Writing for four Justices,
Justice Kennedy offered a more comprehensive list of the uncovered categories:
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a
general matter, only when confined to the few “historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar,” . . .
[including] advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to criminal
conduct; so-called “fighting words”; child pornography; fraud;
true threats; and speech presenting some grave and imminent
threat the government has the power to prevent.128
Without providing detail, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]hese categories have a historical foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition.”129
Justice Kennedy’s list rather strongly suggests that the Court no longer distinguishes between coverage and protection. The clearest indication comes from the
final item on the list, “speech creating some grave and imminent threat the Government has the power to prevent.” Terms like “gravity” and “imminence” are what one
would associate with an analysis applying a stringent standard of review: Because
482 (majority opinion). The Ferber opinion might have involved a statute that was not
substantially overbroad: Nearly every act defined as child pornography involved underlying
acts of child abuse.
125
Id. at 471.
126
For additional discussion of ad hoc exceptions, see infra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
127
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion). For my earlier analysis of the problem presented in Alvarez, published before the Court’s decision, see Mark Tushnet, “Telling
Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact (Harvard Law Sch.
Pub. Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737930
[https://perma.cc/7L4V-8AF8].
128
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (internal citations omitted).
129
Id. I cannot refrain from the observation that the offhandedness of this statement
suggests to me that treating Stevens as creating or invoking a real historical test would be a
mistake, and that at least some of the Justices use the historical test as a shorthand reference
to something else.
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the threat is grave the government has a compelling interest in preventing its realization, and because it is imminent there is no less restrictive alternative to suppression.130
Speech of that sort is covered but not protected. In contrast, the categories listed in
Chaplinsky and repeated in Alvarez were, when initially enumerated by the Court,
not covered by the First Amendment, and some probably cannot reasonably be
understood even today as covered. As discussed earlier, for example, we can understand the permissibility of banning obscene materials only by assuming that laws
doing so need not satisfy a stringent standard of review.
Justice Kennedy’s discussion of falsity also suggests a downplaying of the
coverage/protection distinction because it appears to assume that the Mosley rule
against content-based regulations means that the Court may not distinguish among
categories of expression based on an assessment of whether, or the degree to which,
the speech in each category has what Justice Powell called “constitutional value.”131
Justice Kennedy’s opinion imposed heavy qualifications on Justice Powell’s
observation, repeated in later cases by others, that “there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact.”132 For Justice Kennedy, statements to that effect had to
be taken in their “proper context.”133 The context for each such assertion was one in
which falsity was accompanied by some “legally cognizable harm” such as injury to
reputation or fraud.134 Justice Kennedy’s requirement that harm accompany falsity
suggests that, to him, either the Court is not in a position to assess whether falsity—or
expression more generally—has First Amendment value or that falsity as such does
have First Amendment value. The former view suggests in turn that the First Amendment covers all communicative acts. The latter does so as well, at least if one thinks
that false statements are a paradigmatic example of nearly worthless expressions.135
These considerations suggest that the Court is moving in the direction of
abandoning the coverage/protection distinction. What might be additional consequences of doing so? Suppose that the Court were to abandon Central Hudson and
insist that all regulation of truthful non-misleading commercial speech be subject to
130

See also infra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (discussing why statements that
incite imminent lawless action should be understood as covered but not protected, rather than
as not covered).
131
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
132
Id.
133
See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.
134
Id.
135
Justice Kennedy’s imposition of a requirement that falsity be accompanied by material
harm raises a more general question about First Amendment theory, which I simply flag here.
Congress’s enactment of a statute imposing liability for falsity as such can be taken to reflect
a judgment that the First Amendment, properly interpreted, authorizes regulation of falsity
as such. The Court needs a reason to displace that understanding of the First Amendment’s
meaning. Justice Kennedy alluded to a “slippery slope” reason for doing so. Id. at 2547–48. For
a discussion of the “slippery slope” argument, see infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
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a stringent standard of review. Such speech would then be fully covered by the First
Amendment. The foie gras distributor would win his First Amendment claims (subject to questions about the application of United States v. O’Brien).136 What, though,
of false or misleading commercial speech? All of the Court’s formulations are to the
effect that states have wide freedom to regulate such speech. Or put another way,
false or misleading commercial speech remains subject to the rule of Valentine v.
Chrestensen137: it is not covered by the First Amendment.
Bringing false or misleading commercial speech within the First Amendment’s
coverage while according government significant power to regulate it would be at
least as doctrinally awkward as Central Hudson is. Reasoning backward: That a
regulation of false or misleading speech is constitutionally permissible (that the
speech is covered but not protected) means that the regulation satisfies a stringent standard of review. But, in many settings the latter claim would be difficult to sustain.
There are difficulties even as to falsehoods, but the principal problems arise in
connection with regulation of commercial advertising said to be misleading. First,
falsehoods: As I will discuss in more detail below, United States v. Alvarez holds
that the government cannot regulate falsehood as such (“mere” falsehood).138 Rather,
it must connect the falsehood to some material harm.139 Of course, often the dissemination of a false commercial statement will cause material harm, as by inducing a
consumer to purchase an item because false advertising led him to believe, mistakenly, that the product would do something he wanted done. Suppose, though, the
seller asserts that no one really believed what the advertisement said, or at least
offers to prove that this particular purchaser did not believe it. At that point, the
regulation might penalize the seller for mere falsehood. A flat ban on false advertising would be more restrictive than necessary to avoid the dissemination of falsehoods that cause material harm; a ban coupled with a “no harm, no foul” defense
would be better.140 That would leave us with classic common law fraud, stripping
away much of modern consumer protection law. In addition, in competitive markets
we might expect competitors to challenge false assertions about at least some of a
136

As to the latter, see infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
See 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942).
138
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.
139
See id. (discussing the presence of a legally cognizable harm in the false statement
cases). The term “material” is important here, because it limits the government’s ability to
treat harms to sensibility and the like as justifications for regulation.
140
For additional discussion of the “no harm, no foul” principle, see infra notes 151–55
and accompanying text. I have termed the principle a defense for ease of exposition, but the
analysis would not be significantly different were the cause of action or criminal offense
defined to treat proof of lack of harm or the risk thereof as an element of the cause of action
or criminal offense. In the criminal context there might be an (in my view insubstantial)
argument that allocating the burden of proof to the defendant would violate the Due Process
Clause. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), with Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977).
137
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product’s characteristics.141 Finally, counter-advertising produced by the government
is an obvious less restrictive alternative: Instead of devoting resources to enforcing
the regulatory ban on false advertising, the government could spend the money on
advertising saying that the commercial advertisements that consumers have been
reading are false.142
Whether a ban on misleading commercial advertisements could satisfy a stringent
standard of review is even less clear.143 The Supreme Court’s more recent cases
suggest a degree of suspicion about “categorical” bans on statements as misleading,
that is, bans that assume that all assertions of a specific sort are misleading.144 The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) categorically prohibits advertising that certain
regulated pharmaceutical products have been shown to be effective in treating
medical conditions unless the product’s effectiveness has been established by two
random controlled trials (RCTs), referred to as the “gold standard” or “blue ribbon”
requirement.145 These regulations prohibit advertising that a medication approved
for some uses, because the gold standard requirement has been satisfied as to those
uses, has been shown to be effective in one randomly controlled tried for treating
another condition even if that assertion is true.146 A recent decision by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit casts some doubt on the FDA’s practice.147 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that POM Wonderful had used
an extensive advertising campaign containing many misleading statements about the
medical benefits that had been shown to flow from regular use of pomegranate juice.148
141

The qualification is needed because some characteristics might be inherent in the
product category: One would not expect to see counteradvertising of the form, “They said
that their product is completely safe, but it isn’t. Their product has a fatality rate of 15%; ours
is much better, with a fatality rate of only 7%.”
142
Presumably the government could also ban sale of the product entirely, if the problems
of consumer deception were severe enough.
143
Although the Court has not addressed the question in detail, I assume that “misleadingness” is an objective concept: A statement about a commercial product is misleading
if a reasonable consumer (or perhaps a consumer with moderately impaired evaluative capacities)
would mistakenly infer something about the product from the advertisement.
144
See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1994) (invalidating a ban on a lawyer advertising that she is also a certified public accountant); Peel
v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990) (invalidating
a prohibition on lawyers describing themselves as “specialists” in specific areas). But see
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (upholding as regulating misleading advertising
a ban on practicing optometry under a trade name).
145
See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm3044
85.htm [https://perma.cc/5272-43KJ].
146
This is referred to as advertising for “off label” uses. See Understanding Unapproved Use
of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients
/Other/OffLabel/ucm20041767.htm [https://perma.cc/6JVS-GTL2] (last updated Apr. 11, 2016).
147
POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
148
Id. at 484.
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Among the remedies the FTC ordered was a requirement that POM Wonderful advertisements contain only statements supported by the FDA’s “gold standard”
requirement of two RCTs.149 The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the
advertising campaign had been misleading, but it invalidated that portion of the
remedial order as violating the First Amendment.150 Judge Srinivasan’s opinion
pointed out that under the “categorical bar . . . consumers may be denied useful,
truthful information about products with a demonstrated capacity to treat or prevent
serious disease.”151
Consider, for instance, a situation in which the results of a
large-scale, perfectly designed and conducted RCT show that a
dietary supplement significantly reduces the risk of a particular
disease, with the results demonstrated to a very high degree of
statistical certainty (i.e., a very low p-value)—so much so that
experts in the relevant field universally regard the study as conclusively establishing clinical proof of the supplement’s benefits
for disease prevention. Perhaps, moreover, a wealth of medical
research and evidence apart from RCTs—e.g., observational
studies—reinforces the results of the blue-ribbon RCT. In that
situation, there would be a substantial interest in assuring that
consumers gain awareness of the dietary supplement’s benefits
and the supporting medical research.152
I take this to be something akin to a “no harm, no foul” rule in reverse: The First
Amendment requires that the advertiser be given an opportunity to show that the
advertisement was not in fact objectively misleading. As I have suggested, an approach of that sort shows that banning a category of statements as misleading cannot
satisfy a stringent standard of review.
What about regulation targeted at individual statements for example, imposing
a fine on an advertiser who disseminates a statement shown according to some
stipulated method, to some stipulated level of confidence (rather than assumed) to
be misleading? As with false statements, here too there may be less restrictive
methods available. Counter-advertising, of course, remains available. But, more
significant, so does mandated disclosure. Consider a variant on the example Judge
Srinivasan offered: The advertiser has one RCT supporting its assertions, but the
trial is not large-scale enough to lead experts in the field to consider it conclusive,
149
150
151
152

Id. at 500–01.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 502.
Id.
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and the regulator concludes that, under the circumstances, the advertisement is
objectively misleading. A disclosure that the assertion is supported by only one
RCT, perhaps elaborated somewhat, might well be a less restrictive means of combating misleadingness than a complete ban.153
The foregoing analysis suggests that the coverage/protection distinction remains
important to First Amendment doctrine regarding commercial advertising despite
the Court’s abandonment of the broad rule in Valentine v. Chrestensen that commercial speech is not covered by the First Amendment. The distinction explains the
Court’s assumption that false or misleading commercial advertisements are readily
regulable: Such advertisements are not covered by the First Amendment, whereas
after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.154 truthful advertisements are both covered and protected.155
The Supreme Court appears to have backed up to the edge of abandoning the
coverage/protection distinction, without fully appreciating how the accumulation of
cases and doctrines it was developing would unsettle First Amendment law rather
substantially. Part IV presents reasons for the Court to move away from the edge.
153

Several qualifications or observations about the analysis in the text: (a) Perhaps the
government could show that the specific disclosure would be ineffective. For a general
discussion of limits on disclosures’ effectiveness, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider,
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); (b) The Court of
Appeals said in POM Wonderful that, were the advertiser to have one study of the quality it
described, the First Amendment would preclude the regulator from insisting on a disclosure
that the study was “inconclusive.” 777 F.3d at 502. I take this to be tied tightly to the quality
of the imagined study, and not a general statement about the impermissibility of requiring
a disclosure or disclaimer; (c) First Amendment objections have been raised against compelled
disclosures/disclaimers. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 655 (1985) (upholding a compelled disclosure that an attorney
who promised that clients who lost their cases would not have to pay attorney’s fees would
have to pay court costs). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has dealt with
compelled disclosures in a number of not entirely consistent decisions. Compare R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), with Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (upholding against a First Amendment
challenge a requirement that meat sold at retail disclose the meat’s country of origin).
154
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
155
Writing in United States v. Alvarez, Justice Kennedy endorsed Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy’s observation that “fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections of
the First Amendment.” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (plurality
opinion). This is ambiguous on the coverage/protection question; it might be read to assert
that fraudulent statements—those “made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable
considerations,” id.—are covered but that regulation of fraud satisfies a stringent standard of
review. Even with respect to fraud, questions about whether a regulatory ban is the least restrictive alternative could be raised; government sponsored counteradvertising might be available
in some contexts, and here too a “no harm, no foul” defense might be made available.
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IV. SOME PROBLEMS SUGGESTING THE NEED FOR THE DISTINCTION
Continue with the assumption made in Part III that we have eliminated the
coverage/protection distinction: Every communicative act is covered by the First
Amendment and regulation of covered expression is unconstitutional (the expression
is protected) unless the government can show that the regulation satisfies a stringent
standard of review—a standard incorporating elements like these: The regulation
serves a compelling (or very important) public interest,156 and is the least restrictive
means for doing so (or at least that there are not some obvious available alternatives
that restrict expression less). Put more affirmatively but omitting some nuance,
expression is covered but not protected when the government has compelling reasons
for regulating it. This describes a doctrinal structure that has eliminated the coverage/protection distinction, leaving us with only the distinction between protected
and unprotected speech, the line between them being drawn by the application of a
stringent standard of review.
What problems might there be with such a structure? Begin with a simple
example of a criminal act that consists solely of communicative acts—perjury.157 I
assume that perjury generally is unlawful because it interferes with the course of
justice, for example by forcing the opponent to investigate and disprove the false
assertion and by posing a risk that the court will enter a judgment “not resting on
truth,”158 and that avoiding interferences with the course of justice is a compelling
interest.159 Yet, the perjury offense as conventionally defined might not be (almost
certainly is not) the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. Consider a
bald-faced lie, that is, a lie made in circumstances where no listener would believe
it to be true.160 Bald-faced lies do not interfere with the course of justice because no
156

The usual terminology is “governmental” interest. I use the term “public interest” because it allows for the possibility that there might be a public interest in ensuring that private
parties’ lives are not unduly affected by expressive acts.
157
Schauer, Speech and “Speech,” supra note 13, at 905 (introducing the perjury example).
An analysis similar to the one presented in the text can be developed for the crime of making
false statements to government agents. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (“[W]hoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of
the United States, knowingly and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation . . . shall be fined under this title, [or] imprisoned not
more than 5 years . . . .”).
158
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546 (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)). Justice
Kennedy introduces this proposition with the words “can cause,” which I take to mean,
“poses a risk of causing.” Id.
159
Id. at 2545 (capturing this thought as an interest in avoiding “the costs of vexatious
litigation”).
160
Cf. W. S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO 197 (New York, Edwin F.
Kalmus 1885) (“Merely corroborative detail, intended to give artistic verisimilitude to an
otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.”).
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one believes them and no one spends any effort to investigate and refute them. So,
the interest in protecting the administration of justice could be advanced by allowing
a “no harm, no foul” defense to perjury charges, that is, by allowing the defendant
to prevail if she shows that the (acknowledged) lie posed no risk whatever to the
administration of justice.161 The fact that no such defense is available, nor is it widely
supported as something flowing from the First Amendment, strongly suggests that perjurious statements should be understood as not covered by the First Amendment.162
The category of perjury demonstrates the value of holding on to the coverage/
protection distinction: Eliminate the distinction and we will have difficulty explaining why it is constitutionally permissible to punish perjurers. Of course one could
resolve the problem by eliminating the distinction and accepting the conclusion that
the First Amendment requires that those charged with perjury have the opportunity
to present a “no harm, no foul” defense. Current doctrine has not done so, nor are
there serious indications that it will change in those ways. The historical approach accommodates this conclusion—imposing punishment for perjurious statements “ha[s]
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”—which is itself an indication
that the distinction between coverage and protection does some important work.163
Here I think it useful to return to the “material harm” requirement of Alvarez.
Consider an analysis of the Stolen Valor Act that focuses on the fact, as it appears
to be, that a substantial number of false statements about military honors occur in
contexts where the person making the statement does so for the purpose of gain.164
Sometimes that gain is material, as when the person hopes that it will elicit sympathy from a jury at a criminal trial or a judge in sentencing, or when it is made in
connection with a solicitation for a charity that the person runs.165 I see no good
161

The defense might not be easy to prove, of course, particularly if it were available only
to those who could show that their lies posed no risk whatsoever; that is, it would not be
enough to show that lies did not in fact interfere with the course of justice.
162
I note that one could explain the absence of a “no harm” defense by referring to problems of administration and the cost-saving advantages of denying that defense, and then by
treating those interests as compelling. The more standard view, I think, is that saving costs, at
least where those costs are likely to be low, is not a compelling interest. I discuss some implications of rejecting that (and related) views below, see infra text accompanying notes 163–96.
163
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
164
The analysis that follows was developed in Tushnet, supra note 127.
165
The latter case is United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010),
rev’d, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012). Sometimes the gain is reputational, as appears to have
been the case in Alvarez, where the defendant made the statement while introducing himself
as a new member of a California water district board; one could reasonably think that he
made the statement for the purpose of inducing his listeners to accord his views a degree of
respect that they might not otherwise have had. Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Alvarez clearly
precludes one from treating that sort of gain as sufficiently wrongful as to justify regulation of
the falsity that induces it. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy
wrote, “For all the record shows, respondent’s statements were but a pathetic attempt to gain
respect that eluded him.” Id.
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reason for distinguishing this sort of gain from the harms associated with false
statements made to induce others to hand over money. If so, on Justice Kennedy’s
analysis, legislatures could penalize false statements accompanied by material harm
or material gain of this sort. Suppose, though, that a legislature also concluded that
it would impose an unnecessary burden on the trial process to require that prosecution show that the statement was either made for the purpose of, or had the effect of,
inflicting material loss or achieving material gain of the right sort. That is the Stolen
Valor Act, defended with reference to a legislative concern about saving litigation
costs. It is also the ordinary perjury statute.
Perhaps making perjury a crime could be defended as advancing the interest in
preserving the integrity of judicial proceedings, or as penalizing insults to the legal
system.166 Alvarez characterizes these as compelling interests, as it also characterizes
the interest in preserving the integrity of the government’s system of military
honors.167 But, with respect to the Stolen Valor Act the Court saw no “direct causal
link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”168 It is not clear
to me how one could prove a causal link between an utterance and a harm as generalized as impairing the “integrity” of a system.169 Discussing the required causal
connection, Justice Kennedy wrote, “The Government points to no evidence to
support its claim that the public’s general perception of military awards is diluted
by false claims such as those made by Alvarez.”170 Justice Kennedy did not discuss
the existence or not of such evidence when he dealt with the way perjury “threatens
the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system[,]”171 and as far as
I can tell none of the cases discussing the relation between perjury and the First
Amendment offers such evidence.
The problem of “impairing the integrity of a system” arose again in WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar,172 where a closely divided Court upheld the constitutionality
of a Florida regulation prohibiting candidates for elected judicial office from personally soliciting funds for their candidacies.173 For a plurality of the Court, Chief
166

As an analytic matter, one could contend that the litigation-cost argument is somehow
more substantial with respect to perjury than it is with respect to the Stolen Valor Act.
(Rebecca Tushnet suggested this possibility to me.) Given the fuzziness of the empirical
evidence one might proffer with respect to both statutes, I find it difficult to conclude that
the litigation-cost argument is stronger with respect to perjury, but others may have a different sense of things.
167
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548–49.
168
Id. at 2549.
169
Id. Perhaps lies and perjury manifest a kind of disrespect, for the listener and for the
legal system respectively. Seeking evidence of a “causal link” between the false statements
and that kind of disrespect seems to me to invoke something akin to a category mistake.
170
Id. (citation omitted).
171
Id. at 2546 (citation omitted).
172
135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (plurality opinion).
173
Id. at 1673.
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Justice Roberts applied “exacting scrutiny,” which required that “the restriction [be]
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”174 According to the Chief Justice,
the regulation was narrowly tailored to “advance[ ] the State’s compelling interest
in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”175 Then, after several
paragraphs on the general importance of public perception of judicial independence,
the opinion noted, “The concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not
easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary
record.”176 The Court did not demand proof, instead endorsing the judgment of the
Florida Supreme Court and other rule-makers that the interest in public confidence
in the judiciary was compelling.177 Further, in its analysis of the narrow tailoring
requirement, the Chief Justice’s opinion resonated with Holder in being “mindful”
of the “considered judgments” made by states in regulating judicial campaigns.178
Notably, the Chief Justice’s opinion made no mention of Alvarez.179
It is difficult to know what to make of the differing treatments of the interest in
preserving a system’s integrity—the system of military honors in Alvarez, the judicial
system’s in the perjury case and Williams-Yulee. Undoubtedly, a Court composed
of judges is likely to be quite sensitive to, and perhaps accurate in its judgments
about, claims that certain actions impair the judicial system’s integrity. Holder indicates the Court’s awareness that executive officials might have a better ability to
evaluate non-measurable aspects of national security than judges do. So, the Court
is not self-confident across the board about its evaluative capacity. Then, though, we
might wonder why the Court’s ability to assess the degree to which lies about having
received military honors impair the integrity of the system is greater than Congress’s.
In short, it seems to me difficult to see how the causal link in the context of
perjury and judicial solicitation of campaign funds is different in kind from the
causal links in the context of Holder and the Stolen Valor Act. In Williams-Yulee the
Justices may have believed that because they were judges they could directly
evaluate the claims about how solicitation of campaign funds impaired the integrity
of the judicial system. In Holder, the Court deferred to the executive’s judgment
174

Id. at 1664, 1665. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result, but disagreed that “exacting”
scrutiny was the appropriate test. Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
175
Id. at 1666 (plurality opinion). Justice Ginsburg joined this portion of the Chief Justice’s
opinion, which was therefore the opinion of the Court. Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I join the Court’s opinion save for Part II.”).
176
Id. at 1667 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
177
See id. at 1666.
178
Id. at 1671. The opinion earlier cited Holder as showing that some regulations could
survive stringent scrutiny. Id. at 1665–66.
179
Justice Breyer’s separate opinion cited his separate opinion in Alvarez as exemplifying
what he thought the proper mode of analysis was, id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring), and
Justice Scalia’s dissent cited the majority opinion in Alvarez for rhetorical purposes in its
peroration, id. at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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about national security because the Justices apparently believed that they were not
in as good a position to evaluate the executive’s claims.180
I believe that similar deference would have been appropriate in Alvarez. But,
having framed the problem as one with respect to which the Court had to evaluate
the claimed impairment of the system of military honors, Justice Kennedy would
have been better off had he simply stated that perjury was one of those categories
of speech, referred to in Stevens, that historically have been treated as outside the
First Amendment’s coverage (and that the Court now recognizes that perjury should
be on Chaplinsky’s historically justified list). Perhaps a similar historical claim
could have been made about the regulation at issue in Williams-Yulee.181
At this point returning to the topic of obscenity is helpful. Materials not covered
by the First Amendment are outside its scope. The Court’s struggles with the law of
obscenity before Miller showed that a doctrine that distinguishes between what is
inside and what is outside the First Amendment’s scope requires careful attention
to where the line between the inside and the outside is drawn. Later developments
in the First Amendment law dealing with sexually explicit expression suggest, though
perhaps do not definitively confirm, that the Court divides sexually explicit material
between that which is outside the First Amendment’s scope, or, equivalently, as not
covered by the First Amendment, and that which is inside its scope. So, in upholding
a regulation that prohibited public nudity as applied to “strip clubs” that present
nude dancing as entertainment, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “nude dancing of the
kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters
of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”182 New York v.
Ferber described child pornography as “a category of material outside the protection
of the First Amendment.”183
Concerns about the boundary between the covered and the not-covered motivate
the Court’s treatment of libel law as a First Amendment problem. Here we can begin
with what the Court told us Justice Powell meant in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.184
180

See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33 (2010) (drawing on an affidavit from the executive branch).
181
The fact that the Florida rule had been adopted only in 2014, see Williams-Yulee, 135
S. Ct. at 1664 (recounting the circumstances of the rule’s adoption), would weigh against
such a conclusion. For additional discussion of the historical approach, see supra text
accompanying notes 101–10.
182
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added). Seven Justices agreed with this point. See id. at 587 (White, J., dissenting).
183
458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (emphasis added). The formulation “outside the protection”
might suggest that child pornography is covered by the First Amendment but not protected
by it, but the inside/outside metaphor that Ferber uses is more compatible with the coverage/
protection distinction. (The phrase “material not protected by the First Amendment” would
be the natural way to express the thought that the material was covered but not protected.)
184
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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when he said (as explained by the Court in United States v. Alvarez185) that “there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact” that injure reputation.186 The
First Amendment does not bar states from imposing liability on those who make
false statements that injure reputation, when they do so with knowledge of the
statements’ falsity or with reckless disregard of whether the statements are true or
false.187 Suppose we eliminate the coverage/protection distinction. We would then
have to say that imposing liability for making these statements served a compelling
interest in the least restrictive way.
Note that if the interest in protecting reputation is compelling, it is compelling
with respect to all false statements of fact that injure reputation, not merely those
made recklessly. And, it seems to me, imposing liability for making false statements
of fact that injure reputation is indeed the least restrictive means of serving that
interest. The “knowledge/reckless disregard” standard has to come from somewhere
else. Where it comes from is, of course, clear from the Court’s decisions. It is a rule
designed to ensure that people are not deterred from making true statements of fact
that injure reputation by the risk that judges and juries will mistakenly find a (true)
fact to be false. The best way to understand this analysis is through the coverage/
protection distinction: False statements of fact that injure reputation are outside the
First Amendment’s scope/are not covered by the First Amendment. Those who make
some such false statements cannot be held liable for the reputational injury they
cause, but not because what they said has First Amendment value. Rather, they
receive an immunity from liability for strategic reasons, to ensure that true statements of fact are uttered without fear of liability on the part of those making them.
Could such a strategic argument be available for false statements as such? I
begin with the observation that the state of mind required for punishing lies is
almost exactly the same as that required for imposing liability for false statements
that injure reputation—knowledge of falsity. Consider then a statute like the Stolen
Valor Act that singles out a specific category of lies for punishment. If imposing
liability for knowingly making false statements that injure reputation does not raise
constitutional concerns about deterring people from making similar false statements
with a different state of mind, it is difficult to see how imposing liability for knowingly making false statements within the statutory category could raise such concerns.
And, indeed, in Alvarez, Justice Kennedy did not discuss deterrence with respect to
statements about military honors. Rather, as noted earlier, he relied on a different
deterrence argument, expressing a slippery-slope concern:
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone
is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that
185

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (Gertz and similar cases deal
with “legally cognizable harm[s] associated with a false statement.”)
186
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
187
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2560–61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give
government a broad censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s
cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the
exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment
cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain
a foundation of our freedom.188
That is, allowing the government to impose liability for knowingly false statements
about the receipt of military honors gives the government the power to impose
liability for knowingly false statements falling in other categories, and the mere
knowledge that the government has that power will deter—“chill”—people from
knowingly making false statements with respect to everything (because the government has the power to identify any category as one where it will impose liability for
knowingly making false statements).189
There are at least two responses to this slippery-slope concern. First, recall that
in the libel context the Court’s strategic concern is with deterrence of the making of
true statements, an obviously significant concern. In contrast, it is hardly obvious
that deterring people from knowingly making false statements is a bad thing—or,
more precisely, that a legislative decision to deter people from lying is constitutionally acceptable only if the legislature has a compelling reason for doing so and the
regulatory measure is the least restrictive means of doing so.190 Justice Breyer’s
188

Id. at 2547–48 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the “mens rea requirement” to prevent the chilling of speech by honest speakers).
190
But see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1482–83 (2015) (identifying a category of high-value
lies that include those told by investigative reporters to get access to politically significant
information). Other examples offered by Chen and Marceau are lies told by police undercover agents and those told by civil rights testers. Id. at 1462–65. It is far from clear to me
that it would be unconstitutional for a legislature to prohibit such lies even if doing so was
not the least restrictive means of deterring deception in those contexts. Chen and Marceau’s
strongest case involves “Ag Gag” laws prohibiting the use of deception to get access to
agricultural production facilities. Id. at 1484–85. They point out that such laws “go beyond
generally applicable trespass laws . . . [and] laws prohibiting fraud [and] invasions of privacy,”
id. at 1469, and so may be more restrictive than necessary to advance the public interest in
protecting private property and privacy.
In response, one might think that penalizing liars is the least restrictive means for advancing
a strong public interest in deterring lies. Further, perhaps on analogy to R. A. V., suppressing
one form of lying for the very purpose of suppressing the type of information often revealed as
a result of that type of lie should be held to violate a First Amendment principle against intentional efforts to suppress speech of a particular sort (here, the information revealed by the investigations that occurred because of the lies). Cf. id. at 1484 (describing Ag Gag laws as twice
content-based); id. at 1487–88 (discussing R. A. V.). Or, perhaps the Ag Gag laws might violate
a non–First Amendment right. Finally, perhaps we should draw an analogy between the regulation of commercial speech and the regulation of lies and say that high-value lies are covered by
189
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concurring opinion in Alvarez alluded to situations in which lies might be socially
valuable:
False factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for
example: in social contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the
sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise preserve calm in
the face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as Socrates’ methods suggest) examination
of a false statement (even if made deliberately to mislead) can
promote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.191
Justice Breyer’s observation may well be true, but the “chilling effect” argument
works only if liars might be concerned with the possibility that the government might
outlaw lies of the sort they are uttering. And, even then, at the moment of telling the lie,
there would be no deterrence if no statute on the books makes it an offense to tell a lie
of the relevant sort (“shielding the person from prejudice,” for example). Acknowledging a power in the government to punish lies as such then raises basic questions of
constitutional theory: Justice Breyer thinks (as do many of us, perhaps) that some lies
are socially valuable.192 The relevant question, though, is whether a legislature should
be precluded from concluding otherwise, that is, from concluding that lies within some
categories are not socially valuable. Nothing in Alvarez addresses that question.
The second problem with Justice Kennedy’s slippery-slope argument is that, like
all such arguments, it works only if we can identify some reason why a legislature,
knowing that it has the power to punish lies as such, would do so with respect to lies
that many people believe to be socially valuable or at least inoffensive.193 The most
plausible reason is something like this: Once having exercised the power to punish
some lies, representative legislatures might begin to think more generally that lies
in other categories are not as socially valuable (or inoffensive) as people previously
thought.194 It is not clear to me that this is so as a matter of empirical reality. But,
even were it so, it is not clear why we should be bothered. Slippery-slope arguments
the First Amendment (as is truthful commercial speech), while low-value lies are outside its coverage (as are misleading commercial statements). My views on these questions are unsettled.
191
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring).
192
Id.
193
See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 380 (1985) (describing
the general problems associated with slippery-slope arguments); Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1026–27 (2003) (describing the
circumstances under which slippery-slope arguments can have bite).
194
The fact that the legislature is representative is important here, because its members
would not adopt the posited statute unless they believed that enough of their constituents
thought prohibiting the specific class of lies was good policy.
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work because we are concerned that when we reach the bottom of the slope we will
find ourselves doing things that we would have thought normatively undesirable
when we were at the top of the slope. In the present context, though, it is not clear what
is wrong with sliding down the slope. Norm change is a common phenomenon, and the
fact that at the bottom of the slope we find ourselves normatively approving things
(punishing some lies) that we disapproved of earlier does not seem categorically
different from the outcome of other processes of norm change. Moreover, in the
specific context of lies, it is not clear that even at the top of the slope we think that
lying is socially valuable. My own view, for what it is worth, is that many people
regard the lies Justice Breyer describes as understandable but regrettable, not normatively desirable in themselves.
I have argued that the best interpretation of existing Supreme Court doctrine is
that perjurious statements, obscenity, and false statements of fact that injure reputation are not covered by the First Amendment, though some of the latter receive
constitutional protection for strategic reasons derived from the First Amendment.195
I conclude this Part with the question of statements that incite imminent lawless action.
Brandenburg tells us that the First Amendment allows governments to punish those
who make such statements.196 Is the best explanation for that result that such statements are not covered by the First Amendment, or that they are covered but not protected? If the latter, the analysis would be that such statements have First Amendment
value (unlike false statements of fact or obscenity), and that punishing those who make
them serves a compelling public interest in avoiding law-breaking by the least restrictive means available, intervening only at the point where words are highly likely to
trigger (incite, by bypassing the listeners’ deliberative processes) unlawful action
(where the law-breaking is imminent). In contrast, if inciting statements are not covered
by the First Amendment, the analysis is that punishing those who make such statements
is a reasonable way of ensuring public order. The relevant cases do not indicate definitively which analysis is the correct one, but, in my ears, the opinions’ tones incline toward the first (covered but not protected) position rather than the second (not covered).
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DISTINCTION, AND PROBLEMS WITH THEM
This Part examines some alternatives to the coverage/protection distinction.197 The
Court could treat all communicative activity as covered by the First Amendment, but
instead of subjecting regulation of all communicative activities to a stringent standard
195

See Eugene Volokh, Knowingly False Statements of Fact and the First Amendment,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/17/know
ingly-false-statements-of-fact-and-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/3NVX-9LFY] (describing when knowingly false statements may receive constitutional protection).
196
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
197
For Schauer’s discussion of a related topic, see Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First
Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 299–308 (“The Paths to Nonprotection”).
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of review it would accord different degrees of protection to different categories of
communicative activities; it could come up with an eclectic (which is to say, untheorized) list of exceptions to the application of a stringent standard of review; it
could apply a uniform standard of review to all forms of speech, with the effect of
sometimes making it easier to justify regulation (“leveling down”), sometimes making doing so more difficult (“leveling up”). I argue that all these alternatives have
substantial drawbacks.
A. The Possibility of Intermediate Categories and Standards of Review
Central Hudson illustrates the possibility of treating some material covered by
the First Amendment as regulable by rules that satisfy something less than a stringent standard of review.198 Having abandoned Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court
seemed to understand that some seemingly defensible forms of regulating commercial advertising could not survive stringent review.199 Its solution was Central Hudson,
a four-part test that required a “substantial” interest, not a compelling one.200 As we
have seen, though, the Court has moved strongly in the direction of converting Central
Hudson into a stringent standard of review by applying its rule that regulations of
truthful and non-misleading commercial speech are impermissible “if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction.”201
As I have suggested, one reason for the Court’s direction appears to be that an
analysis that subjects some speech regulations to a stringent standard of review and
others to a less stringent one is inconsistent with the Mosley principle that regulations
that distinguish on the basis of subject matter are impermissible. That difficulty would
of course attend any effort to create intermediate categories and standards of review.
In addition, the basis upon which the Court could rest differentiating among
subject matters is questionable. One could convert Stevens’s historical criterion from
one identifying material outside the First Amendment’s scope into one identifying
categories of speech that receive differentiated degrees of protection. Yet, the purely
historical approach suffers from a historical problem, as Lakier’s study shows,202 and
that problem would be even worse were the object of inquiry to be categories of
speech receiving differentiated review: If there is little evidence that the Court had
a coherent concept of low value speech as a residual category, there is essentially none
that it had a concept of categories of speech receiving differentiated review.
198

Cf. Schauer, Speech and “Speech,” supra note 13, at 907 (“A second alternative would
be to maintain . . . that some categories of utterances are protected to a lesser degree than
others.”).
199
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980); see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942).
200
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
201
Id. at 564.
202
Lakier, supra note 28, at 2168.
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Chaplinsky’s functional strand, in contrast, is well-designed for identifying categories of speech that would receive different degrees of protection. That is indeed
how the government used Chaplinsky in Stevens. But, according to the Court, such
an approach “is startling and dangerous.”203 The opinion continued, “[T]he First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”204 That sentence might only mean that such a balancing is impermissible to determine whether
speech is covered by the First Amendment, leaving open the possibility that balancing would be allowed to determine the degree of scrutiny regulations of specific
classes of speech might receive. That reading is undermined by Chief Justice Roberts’s
observation that “[t]he First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that
some speech is not worth it.”205 It is undermined as well by Stevens’s substantive
analysis. Having brought “crush videos” within the First Amendment’s coverage,
the Court did not next ask whether it should develop some intermediate standard of
review; rather, it invoked “our existing doctrine,” calling for stringent review.206
Justice Breyer’s approach in Alvarez suggests another approach to differentiating among categories of speech within the First Amendment’s coverage. Consistent
with his general approach to adjudication, Justice Breyer’s analysis in Alvarez is
compatible with an analysis requiring proportionality between restrictions on expression and a legislature’s goals.207 Proportionality analysis is an invitation to judges to
replace a legislature’s judgment about what is proportionate with their own judgment
on the same question, and so (as noted earlier in connection with other approaches)
brings us to the deepest questions of constitutional theory.208
A final difficulty with taking a differentiated approach is this: Such an approach
treats the First Amendment as something like an onion.209 The onion consists of
203

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2010).
Id. at 468.
205
Id. at 470.
206
Id. at 472.
207
See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3096–97 (2015); Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization
of Free Speech Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511–12 (2014) (discussing Justice Breyer’s
“proportionality review”).
208
Proportionality analysis is well-designed for purposes of judicial decision-making, but
it does less well in providing guidance to legislators, except perhaps as a caution against doing
foolish things. See MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74–83 (2014) (describing the merits of, and drawbacks to, proportionality
analysis).
209
For an earlier brief discussion of the onion model, see Mark Tushnet, The Redundant
Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 78–79 & nn.30–36 (2001).
204
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everything covered by the First Amendment.210 The onion’s layers are the categories,
and regulations of speech within each layer receive their own differentiated standard
of review. Of course, onions have many layers, and the prospect of proliferating
standards of review is not attractive. Yet, nothing in the differentiating approach
suggests standards for determining how thick each layer should be, that is, how large
the category should be.

210
Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“[N]ude
dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer
perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.” (emphasis
added)). The phrase “only marginally so” suggests the onion model.
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Particularly worrisome is a possibility that arises as we reach the First Amendment’s core protections of political speech: The Court might devise a category of
speech that is “nearly-but-not-quite” political and use something less than stringent
review to uphold regulations of speech in that category.211 Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project illustrates the problem.212 The Court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute making it a crime to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations, as applied to a group that gave advice to such organizations about how to use
international law to resolve disputes peacefully.213 The Court applied what it described as the usual standard of review applied to content-based restraints.214 Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court deferred to legislative and executive judgments in deciding that providing advice to terrorist groups harms the compelling
interest in combating terrorism, because the advice “frees up other resources within
the organization that may be put to violent ends[,]” “helps lend legitimacy” to the
groups, and “strain[s] the United States’ relationships with its allies.”215 Acknowledging that the Court ordinarily does not defer to legislative and executive judgments about the relationship between regulations and harm—as indeed all the other
cases reviewed so far in this Essay show—the Chief Justice alluded to the case’s
circumstances, which counseled the Court to rely on “informed judgment rather than
concrete evidence.”216
On the face of it, the Court’s opinion does not apply a stringent standard of review in the manner it does in other cases.217 The Chief Justice’s opinion limited the
statute’s application to advice given in “coordination” with a terrorist group, strongly
suggesting that it would be unconstitutional to penalize the Humanitarian Law Project
for broadcasting advice targeted to a terrorist group without coordinating its efforts
with the group.218 That limitation seems arbitrary: Uncoordinated advice, if taken by
the group, can free up resources and build legitimacy no less than coordinated advice
can.219 The onion model suggests an explanation for the Court’s approach: Uncoordinated advice remains in the core of political speech, protected by a stringent standard
of review, while coordinated advice lies somewhere outside the core, in another layer
that receives less stringent protection.
211

Cf. Schauer, Speech and “Speech,” supra note 13, at 908 (“At the heart of a definitional approach . . . is the idea that decreased pressure at the level of coverage is reflected
in increased pressure at the level of protection.”).
212
561 U.S. 1 (2010).
213
Id. at 36, 40.
214
Id. at 28.
215
Id. at 30, 32.
216
Id. at 34–35.
217
Compare id. at 40, with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942) (showing
the court’s evolving standard of scrutiny).
218
See Holder, 561 U.S. at 40.
219
See, e.g., Catherine A. Hardee, The Coordination Conundrum, 49 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 189 (2012).
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The Court has used a differentiated approach with respect to the category of
communicative conduct. Such conduct is covered by the First Amendment and is
assessed pursuant to the standard set out in United States v. O’Brien.220 That standard
resembles Central Hudson. It requires that the governmental interest be “important or
substantial,” and that “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
[be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”221 If Central
Hudson has been transformed in the direction of increasing stringency, O’Brien has
been transformed in the other direction: The Court has not applied the requirement
that the restriction be “no greater than essential” with anything like the stringency
with which it has applied Central Hudson’s requirement that the restriction “be no
more broad or no more expansive than ‘necessary.’”222 In practice, legislatures can
impose reasonable regulations on communicative conduct if their reasons for doing
so are unrelated to the communicative conduct’s content.223
R. A. V. provides another example of difficulties associated with developing a
differentiated set of standards of review. There Justice Scalia addressed the claim
that treating hate speech taking the form of fighting words as viewpoint based would
place laws against workplace sexual harassment under a constitutional cloud.224 He
responded that sometimes words could “violate laws directed not against speech but
against conduct . . . , a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class
of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.”225 The utterance of “sexually derogatory ‘fighting words’”
could violate the ban on gender discrimination in the workplace.226 Justice Scalia
noted that “other words” might similarly be “swept up incidentally.”227 O’Brien is
such a case. So might be the antitrust case described at the outset of this Essay:
Antitrust law is aimed at anti-competitive conduct, but words of agreement not to
compete might be swept up within the statute. And, again, what seemed a possibly
differentiated set of categories appears to be reduced to a requirement of rationality.
That shows the difficulty of sustaining a differentiated set of categories, but
there is an additional wrinkle. Cohen v. California228 invalidated the application of
a statutory prohibition of disorderly conduct to someone who had worn a jacket with
220

391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (laying out the O’Brien test).
Id.
222
Bd. of Trs. of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 467, 480 (1989) (citation omitted) (explaining
Central Hudson as requiring only that the regulation be “reasonable” and proportionate). As
discussed earlier, this view of Central Hudson has come under increasing attack in recent years.
223
This is sufficient to deal with the foie gras case, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. LT
Napa Partners LLC, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015), even putting aside the commercial setting in which that problem arises.
224
R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992).
225
Id.
226
Id. (citations omitted).
227
Id. at 389.
228
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
221
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“Fuck the Draft” written on its back.229 Of course, one can engage in disorderly
conduct in many ways that do not involve words. Why then is Cohen not a case in
which words other than those independently proscribable are “swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct”?230 Because, apparently, there “the
government . . . target[ed] conduct on the basis of its expressive content.”231
The result of all this is that the Court has developed a set of doctrines that
preserves some well-established and seemingly correct results: Perjury statutes
survive because of Stevens’s historical test; antitrust liability survives because it
regulates conduct and only incidentally sweeps up some words. The doctrines,
though, unsettle other well-established results: Bans on misleading (and perhaps
even false) advertising are constitutionally vulnerable, as are regulations of speech
associated with labor organizing. Developing a set of categories of content-based
regulations subject to differentiated standards of review might deal with some of
these latter cases. But it is not the path the Court has followed, and is attended by
a number of difficulties that the Court has itself described.
B. An Eclectic Set of Exceptions
Another possibility is to treat the results that seem worth preserving as ad hoc
exceptions to the overarching doctrinal structure. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alvarez
provided a laundry list of exceptions from protection (understood to mean exceptions from the general rule that content-based speech regulations are constitutionally
permissible only if they satisfy a stringent standard of review).232 Eugene Volokh
adopts a similar strategy in organizing the presentation of First Amendment doctrine:
Full protection (again, a stringent standard of review) is the default, with a list of “exceptions” labeled as such: incitement, false statements of fact, obscenity, “‘integral
part’ of criminal conduct,” offensive speech, threats, and “speech owned by others.”233
These lists do not seem to be compiled according to any single approach to the
First Amendment. Some, such as incitement and true threats, can be handled by
applying a stringent standard of review. I have suggested that the best reading of the
Court’s incitement doctrine is that regulations of incitement satisfy a stringent standard of review because inciting speech bypasses the listeners’ ordinary methods of
229

Id. at 16, 26.
R. A. V., 505 U.S. at 389 (citations omitted).
231
Id. at 390.
232
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion).
233
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES
AND POLICY ARGUMENTS xiii–xiv (4th ed. 2011). Volokh, supra note 2, at 1015–51, offers
what he characterizes as a generalized account of exceptions—attempting to subsume most
of them under the exception for speech integral to criminal conduct—but, at least as I read
the argument, he gives such varying content to the term “integral” with respect to specific
exceptions as to reintroduce the ad hoc approach.
230
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making judgments and because the immediacy of its impact makes intervention
against the speech the least restrictive means of dealing with the compelling interest
in avoiding criminal disorder.234 A similar analysis applies to true threats: They inflict
injury upon their receipt by their targets, who immediately are put in fear,235 and
intervention against the threats is the least restrictive means of forestalling the fear.
Other items on the lists cannot be dealt with in the same way, as the earlier discussion of obscenity indicates.236 For present purposes, the most interesting category
is speech that is said to be an integral part of criminal conduct.237 The key feature of
such speech is that the regulations penalize the speech itself, independent of the
speech’s contribution to the criminal conduct. Incitements cause criminal conduct,
but punishing incitement survives the stringent standard of review. The point of
having a category of “speech integral to criminal conduct” as an exception to protection is to allow the government to penalize such speech without satisfying such
a standard. Ferber offers a good example. It is constitutionally permissible to prohibit
the dissemination of child pornography, according to the Court, because making
child pornography necessarily involves abusing children, and prohibiting the dissemination of such material reduces the demand for them and thereby reduces the
incidence of child abuse.238 Yet, if one were to apply the “less restrictive alternative”
test as the Court applies it in cases involving commercial speech, for example, it is
far from evident that a ban on possessing child pornography is the least restrictive
means: Prosecuting those who make the pornography, and who thereby engage in
child abuse, would seem a less restrictive means.239
Much, of course, turns on what counts as being “integral” to the otherwise-defined
criminal conduct. Still, the motivation for the category’s existence seems clear, and
revealing: Sometimes it is very difficult to punish actions that legislatures both can
(constitutionally) make criminal and have made criminal. For example, in the child
pornography cases, it might be quite difficult to locate the person who abuses a child
in the process of producing the material. Or, it might relatively easy to identify the
speaker and thwart the realization of the crime. The motivation for the exception is
234

See supra text accompanying notes 195–96.
The targets may also begin to take precautions against the threats’ realization, but those
steps do not follow immediately, in the temporal sense, on the threats’ receipt.
236
See supra text accompanying notes 181–83.
237
For a comprehensive overview of First Amendment issues associated with crime, see
generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989).
238
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753, 759–62, 774 (1982).
239
The means would be less restrictive, but of course there would also be some loss in the
prevention or punishment of child abuse. As has been known for quite a while, “less
restrictive means” analysis almost inevitably is a form of sub rosa evaluation of the relative
importance of competing substantive interests. The classic statement is Robert Nagel, Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 151 (1972). The
suggestion made in the text is therefore one about how the Court’s use of the implicit
balancing test in child pornography cases compares with its use in commercial speech cases.
235
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that going after the speech simply makes sense from a crime-prevention point of
view even if doing so cannot fairly be said to satisfy a stringent standard review. We
(and the courts) want to go after the speech for good reasons that are not quite good
enough to satisfy a stringent standard of review, and the courts allow us to do so by
creating the exception. Reasoning backward from results to doctrine is entirely appropriate, and forms the basis for my suggestion about how the courts should reconstruct
the coverage/protection distinction.
C. Applying a Uniform Standard of Review to All Covered Communicative Activity
Finally, without the coverage/protection distinction the Court could apply a
uniform standard of review to all communicative activity.240 This might take one of
three forms: (1) leveling downward by applying a single standard of review weaker
than the current stringent standard; (2) leveling upward by applying the current standard in all cases; or (3) applying a requirement that all regulations be proportional
to the interests they purport to serve. Here too all the approaches have drawbacks.
1. Leveling Down
The difficulty of showing that perjury statutes satisfy the current stringent
standard shows why there might be pressure to level downward. In Justice Breyer’s
words, “the Court could escape the problem by watering down the force of the
presumption against constitutionality that ‘strict scrutiny’ normally carries with
it.”241 As Professor Schauer has shown, there are large swathes of regulatory law that
pose the same problem that perjury statutes do.242 As he points out, many provisions
of federal securities law impose liability on stock issuers for statements that are
presumed to be misleading despite the fact that in other contexts First Amendment
law seems to be developing in a direction that makes it questionable to have categorical presumptions of misleadingness.243 Some contracts—agreements manifested in
words—are per se violations of the antitrust laws, which means that those challenging the agreements need not show that the agreements actually caused harm.244 The
240

Subject to the possibility, discussed supra text accompanying notes 220–23, that a different
standard of review could be used in cases involving regulations of expressive conduct.
241
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring); see
also id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) (using the metaphor of “watering down”).
242
Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, at 1768 (including in the “vast universe of widely
accepted content-based restrictions on communication” the Securities Act of 1933, the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Uniform Commercial
Code); id. at 1778–83 (examining speech-regulating aspects of the securities, antitrust, and
labor laws); Schauer, supra note 197, at 302–03 (listing price fixing and contract law as
“outside the First Amendment”).
243
See supra text accompanying notes 138–39.
244
See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, at 1770 (describing the application of the
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National Labor Relations Act requires that elections to select a collective bargaining
agent be conducted in a “laboratory” setting, that is, without the interjection by
means of speech and pamphlets of expression that would tilt the election field away
from encouraging workers to make their decisions “on the merits.”245 As Schauer
observes, these regulations are exceedingly difficult to justify under the current
stringent standard of review.246 Were the Court to say that regulations of all communicative activities had to satisfy a stringent standard of review, and were it to seek
to preserve the results under the securities, antitrust, and labor laws, it would have
to weaken the current standard of review—level down, in short.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project illustrates the dynamic: Perhaps the Court
believed that the regulation there had to be constitutionally permissible, and adjusted
the standard of review accordingly. Notice, though, the structure of that analysis.
Some results, such as upholding the securities, antitrust, and labor laws against a
First Amendment challenge, seem or are assumed to be obviously correct.247 So, to
preserve the results, the Court adjusts the content of the standard of review.248 This
recreates the patchwork that the elimination of the coverage/protection distinction
was supposed to destroy.
Stevens might be thought to offer an escape hatch. The Court there acknowledged the possibility that there might be categories of speech the regulation of which
had historically not been thought to raise First Amendment problems.249 As discussed earlier, much here depends on the content of this historical test.250 The
securities, antitrust, and labor law rules go back to the 1930s and a bit earlier. Is that
long enough to satisfy the historical test?251

antitrust laws to “corporate executives [who] . . . exchang[e] accurate information about
proposed prices with their competitors”).
245
See In re General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 189 (1948).
246
See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, at 1782–83.
247
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
248
In the philosophy of science, an analogous process is described as “saving the
phenomena.” See, e.g., PIERRE DUHEM, TO SAVE THE PHENOMENA: AN ESSAY ON THE IDEA
OF PHYSICAL THEORY FROM PLATO TO GALILEO 116–17 (Edmund Doland & Chaninah
Maschler trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1969) (1908). When a scientist observes a result that seems
incompatible with prevailing theory, he or she tweaks the theory to accommodate the new
observation. Id.
249
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).
250
See supra Part III.
251
All three areas involve the regulation of speech made in connection with commercial
activities, and the basic statutes were adopted at a time when commercial speech was outside
the First Amendment’s coverage. So, in some sense, it is obviously true that those regulations
were not thought to raise First Amendment concerns. Lakier’s analysis is relevant here as
well, because—to overstate for effect—until the 1930s nothing was thought to raise First
Amendment concerns, in the sense that no regulations of speech were tested by a stringent
standard of review. Lakier, supra note 28, at 217–19.
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A different, more originalist approach seems more compatible with the general
thrust of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence. That approach would ask whether the
type of regulation at issue was thought to be freely regulable in 1791, when the First
Amendment was adopted (or, with respect to state legislation, in 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted). Not having done the historical research and
not knowing of anyone who has, I cannot be sure what it would show. I suspect that
one could find scattered weak analogues to some contemporary regulations of
securities or labor relations. Were one inclined to, one could rely on them or dismiss
them as isolated examples. The more important point, of course, is that there was
nothing in the founding era at all similar to the comprehensive regulatory schemes
we now have for pharmaceuticals, antitrust, securities, and labor relations. One of
the common complaints about originalism, that it cannot accommodate truly substantial changes in social, economic, and political circumstances, has real bite here.
The bottom line is that a Court that both used a uniform standard of review and
sought to preserve some seemingly obvious results would face pressure to level the
standard downward.
2. Leveling Up
The direction that the law of commercial speech has taken illustrates the possibility of leveling upward, that is, of applying the current stringent standard of review,
in all its stringency, to all communicative activity. Leveling upward would place
substantial clouds over many areas of labor and securities law. The POM Wonderful
case, for example, casts doubt on the FDA’s “gold standard” requirement for advertising about off-label uses.252
Leveling upward does require that we bite the bullet and accept the possibility
that many features of the existing regulatory state are unconstitutional under the
First Amendment. The bullet is quite a large one, though. According to Schauer, for
example, it includes “virtually the entirety of the law of evidence” and “large segments
of tort law.”253 Abandoning the coverage/protection distinction and leveling upward
252

See supra text accompanying note 150; see also United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d
149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding unconstitutional the prosecution of a pharmaceutical
sales person who had promoted off-label uses that had not gone through the “gold standard”
process). The FDA chose not to seek Supreme Court review of the Caronia decision. See
Alison Frankel, Why U.S. Is Forgoing Appeal of Landmark 2nd Circuit Off-Label Ruling,
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/01/24/why-u-s-is-for
going-appeal-of-landmark-2nd-circuit-off-label-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/7WLY-UC8F].
253
Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, at 1784 (citing, inter alia, Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudicatory Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705 (2004)); see also
Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161,
161 (1990). Schauer provides this tort law example: “whether a chainsaw manufacturer may
be held liable in a products liability action for injuries caused by mistakes in the written
instructions accompanying the tool.” Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 13, at 1770.
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would be consistent with the strand in contemporary constitutional law in which the
First Amendment replaces the Due Process Clause and Lochner v. New York 254 as
the locus in the constitution for resistance to the modern regulatory state.255 There
is, I think, little more that can be said about leveling upward: it would require substantial rethinking of how the modern regulatory state operates. Perhaps that would
be a good thing.
3. Proportionality and Robust Reasonableness
Justice Breyer has forcefully advocated for the adoption of a unified approach
to the problems this Essay deals with. He would “ask[ ] whether the regulation at
issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of
the relevant regulatory objectives.”256 He suggests giving the proportionality analysis some structure: “Answering this question requires examining the seriousness of
the harm to speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to
which the law will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.”257
I can deal with this proposal quite briefly. The reasons the Court had in Stevens
for rejecting balancing apply to proportionality as well: Both give judges too much
discretion. Adopting Justice Breyer’s proposal would require substantial rethinking
of the structure of First Amendment law. Perhaps that too would be a good thing.
VI. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? THE “TOO MUCH WORK” PRINCIPLE
The diagrams I have offered sketch alternative visions of the structure of First
Amendment doctrine. In that sense they offer alternative meta-doctrines of the First
Amendment. Other types of meta-doctrine offer guidance on the question of choosing among alternative doctrinal structures—that is, on choosing among a structure
with the coverage/protection distinction, the onion model, or generalized balancing
(and whatever other overall doctrinal structures we could come up with).
254

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
The earliest work making this point is Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1
(1979). For recent summaries of the accumulating literature to this effect, see generally
Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165
(2015); Shanor, supra note 14.
256
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235–36; see also United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–53 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
257
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). For him, contentdiscrimination would remain relevant as “a helpful . . . tool” in conducting the “more basic”
proportionality analysis, probably by signaling that one or another of the elements of the
proportionality analysis should receive greater or lesser weight. Id. at 2235.
255
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To illustrate: The First Amendment’s doctrinal structure could be coherent if the
Court completely abandoned the coverage/protection distinction, but preserving both
coherence and results that seem reasonably defensible requires a fair amount of
conceptual work. The “too much work” principle offers a reason for maintaining the
distinction. The principle holds that we should be skeptical about doctrines that
require us to engage in a great deal of analytic work to reach results that we were
reasonably confident of, before we engaged in substantial analysis.258 So, for example,
we should hold on to the coverage/protection distinction if it takes a great deal of
analytical work without invoking that distinction to explain why it is permissible for
California to prevent the distribution of foie gras as a protest against the state’s ban
on selling foie gras.
What justifies the “too much work” principle? I am reasonably confident that
it, or something much like it, should be, and probably already is, part of what we can
think of as the meta-doctrine of the First Amendment. But I am quite tentative in offering a justification. My present thinking is that it is a strategic meta-doctrine akin to the
meta-doctrine preferring categorical rules to case-specific and categorical balancing.259
The “too much work” principle might be thought of as a doctrinalized form of
standard error-cost and decision-cost analysis. Such an analysis begins with the
observation that the decisional capacities of judges and other decision-makers, measured by time and competence, are limited. Sometimes judges’ decisions are “mistakes” when measured by stated legal rules or deep principles, but the legal system
puts up with the errors because applying the stated rules would take too much time,
as when the rules would require the judge to investigate a large number of factual
predicates, or would be too difficult for a judge of ordinary intellectual capacity to
apply correctly, as when the rules are extremely complex. The “too much work”
principle crystallizes one form of error-cost and decision-cost analysis into a legal
meta-doctrine: The legal system should avoid rules that require ordinary judges to
do too much work to reach the correct result.260 The saving of decision-costs offsets
the losses associated with error-costs.261
258

For my earlier discussion of the “too much work” principle, see Tushnet, supra note
70, at 186.
259
See TUSHNET, supra note 208, at 79–80.
260
It should be noted that it sometimes takes a fair amount of “work” to come up with the
appropriate categorization of some activity as not covered by the First Amendment. But,
once that work is done, application of the doctrine is straightforward. In contrast, applying
the rules regarding levels of scrutiny takes a fair amount of work in every case. (I note that
this argument is vulnerable to the counterargument that, in every case where the government
asserts that some activity fits into an already defined category of uncovered activity, the
claimant can urge that the category should be redefined to exclude the activity at issue, and
resolving that claim will itself take a fair amount of work.)
261
For an application of this sort of analysis for the legal system as a whole, see RICHARD
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). That book’s title offers an articulation
of the kind of second-order analysis that I argue justifies a simple coverage/protection distinction.
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Meta-doctrines of this sort are system-oriented rather than case- or outcomeoriented. So, for example, the stringent standard of review is a (regular or substantive)
doctrine, identifying the test the Court should use when assessing the constitutionality
of statutes regulating speech on the basis of its content. Meta-doctrines of this sort
deal with the form or structure of substantive doctrine.262 The Supreme Court uses
meta-doctrines to develop a structure of substantive doctrine that, when administered by a large number of other decision-makers (both judges and legislators),
produces the outcomes that the Court itself would reach were it to address every case,
knowing that it cannot in fact address every case.263 The more work the doctrine
demands of those other decision-makers, the more likely are divergences between
the results they actually reach and the results the Court would reach but cannot
because of its limited decisional capacity.264
On this view the coverage/protection distinction works like this: Without the
distinction, a lower court asks whether some regulated speech is protected or unprotected. With limited decisional capacity,265 and for that reason doing relatively
little work, the judge concludes that the speech is protected because the regulation
cannot survive a stringent standard of review, and invalidates the regulation. Were
the Supreme Court to consider the case, using its greater decisional capacity it would
do a fair amount of work to show that the speech is not protected. The Court can use
the coverage/protection distinction to communicate to lower courts and other decisionmakers that regulations of speech in the relevant category are unprotected, thereby
allowing the lower courts to reach the result the Supreme Court would reach without
doing extensive work.266
262

Other meta-doctrines deal with the choice between rules and standards, and the use of
constitutional decision rules in place of operative provisions. (The latter terminology is due
to Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).) For a recent
treatment of meta-rules, see Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Judicial Doctrine
as Risk Regulation, 82 TENN. L. REV. 405 (2015).
263
I will sometimes use the shorthand “correct results” to refer to the outcomes the Court
would reach; it does not imply anything about my own agreement with those results. Those
so inclined could restate the problems I identify as implicating the choice of rules with the
characteristic that, according to some metric that takes case-importance into account, minimize the sum of what the higher court regards as Type I and Type II errors by lower courts
not all of whose decisions can be reviewed by the higher court.
264
Cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (“[A] clear and firm rule
governing content neutrality is an essential means of protecting the freedom of speech, even
if laws that might seem ‘entirely reasonable’ will sometimes be ‘struck down . . . .’” (citation
omitted)). This passage is an implicit response to Justice Kagan’s argument that “[w]e apply
strict scrutiny to facially content-based regulations of speech, in keeping with the rationales
[for subjecting content-based speech regulations to the most exacting standard of review].”
Id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment).
265
The limits on capacity can be temporal or intellectual.
266
Note that restoring the coverage/protection distinction does not help—but does not
harm either—in cases where the lower court finds the material unprotected, but the Supreme

1120

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1073

As noted, the “too much work” principle is a meta-doctrine and as such does not
identify which categories should be uncovered. What it does say is conditional: That
it takes a lot of work to explain why some subject matter is freely regulable by the legislature is a reason for treating the subject matter as not covered by the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Meta-doctrines have an important characteristic. They ensure that lower courts
will make unreversed errors from the Court’s point of view. So, for example, treating
fighting words as invisible to the First Amendment would mean that the Court
would not deploy the analysis it actually used in reviewing the state court’s decision
in R. A. V.267 The reason for such restraint would be to preserve the coverage/protection
distinction in a form that lower courts could easily use in the much larger run of
cases where the distinction produces the correct result without requiring those courts
to do too much work.
As with all meta-doctrines, in adopting or reconstructing the coverage/protection
distinction, the Court must make a complex, seemingly empirical judgment: How
many unreversed errors will occur if we direct the lower courts to use the crude
coverage/protection distinction, in light of the limitations on the decisional capacities
of the Supreme Court and of the lower courts, compared to the number and importance
of unreversed errors if the Court directs lower courts to use a more complex “too
much work” form of analysis. Not knowing what the Court regards as error, I have no
way of assessing whether the Court’s current view, that the coverage/protection distinction should be abandoned or substantially weakened, is correct. What my analysis
has done, I hope, is to bring into view the real questions about the distinction’s role
in First Amendment theory.

Court would find it protected. Important as well is the observation that restoring the distinction
does not guarantee that lower courts will always reach correct results from the Supreme
Court’s point of view, nor that the Court will have the capacity to reverse all such errors, but
restoring the distinction is designed to reduce the amount of divergence between lower courts
and the Supreme Court.
267
I use the awkward phrase “not deploy the analysis it actually used” to indicate that
other modes of First Amendment analysis, such as that used by Justice White in dissent,
might allow the Court to reverse the lower court. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 587–96 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).

